application as there was no clear and compelling justification for the lapse of time.26 61. Furthermore, in the instant case, being cognisant of the principle of legal certainty, this Court is constrained in its interpretation of reasonable time and cannot overstretch the construction of reasonableness without decisive elements that are sufficiently proven.27 62. As such, the Applicants’ reliance on the Mabomba Ruling in the present matter cannot stand the test of reasonableness just as it did not in the said Ruling. 63. As a consequence, this Court finds that the present Application, in respect of the First Applicant, does not meet the requirement of reasonableness set out under Article 56(6) of the Charter given that the First Applicant’s case bears exclusively on the Mabomba Ruling. 64. In light of the above, the Court upholds the Respondent State’s objection and finds that the Application was not filed within a reasonable time in respect of the First Applicant. 65. Regarding the Second Applicant, the Court notes that circumstances pertaining to him require taking a different approach in determining reasonableness of time to file his application. Firstly, after the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal on 5 November 2009, the Second Applicant filed an application for review sometime in 2010, which is the very year when the Respondent State filed the Declaration and this Court began to receive cases involving the said Respondent State. As this Court has consistently held, while the review procedure is not a remedy to be exhausted, an applicant cannot be disadvantaged for pursuing it and doing so will be taken Mabomba v. Tanzania (ruling), supra, § 54. See also, Anthony and Kisite v. United Republic of Tanzania (jurisdiction and admissibility) (2019) 3 AfCLR 470, § 49. 27 Rajabu Yusuph v. United Republic of Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application No. 036/2017, Ruling of 22 March 2022 (jurisdiction and admissibility), § 71. 26 17