22. The Court further reiterates that, while national courts are empowered to consider evidentiary issues, as recalled by the Respondent State, the Court’s role is to ensure that domestic proceedings are in compliance with international standards set out in the Charter and any other human rights instruments ratified by the Respondent State.4 Therefore, if the procedure leading to the conviction and sentencing is found to be in violation of the international standards provided for in the Charter, then, the Court is empowered to order the release of an Applicant as one of the remedies under Article 27(1) of the Protocol. 23. In the instant case, the Court notes that the Applicant alleges the violation of the right to defence and the right to a fair trial protected under the Charter to which the Respondent State is a party. Consequently, the application fulfils the material jurisdiction of the Court. 24. From the foregoing, the Court dismisses the objection and finds that it has material jurisdiction in this application. B. Objection to temporal jurisdiction 25. The Respondent State contends that the Court lacks temporal jurisdiction in this application because the alleged violations occurred before the Respondent State ratified the Protocol and they are not continuing. 26. The Applicant avers that the Court is vested with jurisdiction to hear this application under Articles 3 and 27 of the Protocol. *** 4 Kennedy Ivan v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (28 March 2019) 3 AfCLR 48, § 26; Armand Guehi v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 477, § 33; Nguza Viking (Babu Seya) and Johnson Nguza (Papi Kocha) v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (23 March 2018) 2 AfCLR 287, § 35. 7