45 SOERING v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER Such punishment is not consistent with the present state of European civilisation. De facto, it no longer exists in any State Party to the Convention5. Its unlawfulness was recognised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe when it adopted in December 1982, and opened for signature in April 1983, the Sixth Protocol (P6) to the Convention, which to date has been signed by sixteen, and ratified by thirteen, Contracting States. No State Party to the Convention can in that context, even if it has not yet ratified the Sixth Protocol, be allowed to extradite any person if that person thereby incurs the risk of being put to death in the requesting State. Extraditing somebody in such circumstances would be repugnant to European standards of justice, and contrary to the public order of Europe6. The applicant’s surrender by the United Kingdom to the United States could only be lawful if the United States were to give absolute assurances that he will not be put to death if convicted of the crime he is charged with7. No such assurances were, or can be, obtained. The Federal Government of the United States is unable to give any undertaking as to what may or may not be decided, or done, by the judicial and other authorities of the Commonwealth of Virginia8. In fact, the Commonwealth’s Attorney dealing with the case intends to seek the death penalty9 and the Commonwealth’s Governor has never commuted a death sentence since the imposition of the death penalty was resumed in 197710. In these circumstances there can be no doubt whatsoever that the applicant’s extradition to the United States would violate his right to life11. 5 § 102 of the judgment. See, mutatis mutandis, the judgment of 27 February 1987 by the French Conseil d'État in the Fidan case, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 1987, pp. 305-310. 7 See the French Fidan judgment referred to above. 8 § 97 of the judgment. 9 § 20 of the judgment. 10 § 60 of the judgment. 11 This opinion deals only with what I consider to be the essential points. I would just like to add briefly that (a) I cannot agree with the first sub-paragraph of § 86, or with § 89, since these parts of the Court's reasoning leave too much room for unacceptable infringements of the fundamental rights of persons whose extradition is sought, and (b) with due respect for the Court's case-law, I wish to maintain my earlier reservations concerning the matters at issue in § 115, the first sub-paragraph of § 117 and § 127 (see the W v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121-A, p. 42, the Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 35, and the W v. the United Kingdom judgment of 9 June 1988 (Article 50) (art. 50), Series A no. 136-C, p. 26). 6