the trial judge noted that the presumption of death, as established under section 117 of the Respondent State’s Evidence Act, was applicable given that Henry Mwakajila had not been seen or heard of by persons who would ordinarily be expected to have heard from him in the five years preceding the trial. 65. In a similar fashion, the Court of Appeal, in its judgment, acknowledged that the evidence against the Applicant was circumstantial. It then reiterated that for such evidence to found a conviction, it must be capable of no more than one interpretation. The Court of Appeal then considered the evidence against the Applicant, and his co-appellants, before confirming the Applicant’s conviction. 66. In so far as the Applicant alleges that his rights were violated because he was convicted on mere suspicions, therefore, the Court finds the allegation to be baseless. 67. The above notwithstanding, the Court notes that the Applicant was convicted and sentenced to death under the mandatory regime applicable in the Respondent State. This calls into question the possible arbitrariness of the sentence imposed on the Applicant. 68. As established in its jurisprudence, a three-part test is employed in international human rights law in assessing the arbitrariness of a death sentence.21 This test requires checking whether the death sentence is provided for by law, whether the sentence was passed by a competent Court and whether there was due process in the proceedings leading to the imposition of the death sentence. 69. Regarding the first criterion, the Court notes that the death sentence is provided for in section 197 of the Respondent State’s penal code. Thus, the criterion is met in the present case. 21 International Pen and others (on behalf of Ken Saro-wiwa) v. Nigeria, Communication 137/94.139/94,154/96,161/97 (2000) AHRL 212 (ACHPR 1998), §§ 1-10 and 103. 17