82. In this regard, the African Commission, relying on its jurisprudence, takes the view that it would not be logical to require an individual to return to the State where he has allegedly suffered violations of his fundamental rights and from which he had fled, in order to pursue a complaint and/or bring a claim for reparation, 61 and also that if a Complainant cannot turn to the judiciary of his country because of a generalized fear for his life, local remedies would be considered unavailable to him. 62 83. In the African Commission's considered view, the Complainant was justifiably apprehensive of the integrity of the Respondent State's ability to render justice, especially because facts were also presented by the Complainant, which have not been refuted by the Respondent State, to show that there was considerable publicity and widespread campaign by international organizations such as Amnesty International about the Victim's case,63 and that the Respondent State was therefore, aware of the unlawfulness of the Victim's detention but did not carry out any investigations. 84. The African Commission therefore considers that the Respondent State was notified of the violations, failed to act on them and as a consequence, loses its prerogative to settle the matter domestically, especially bearing in mind its primary obligations under the African Charter in respect of allegations of torture to, among other things, initiate a prompt, impartial and effective investigation, establish readily accessible mechanisms to which victims can bring their complaints and above all, ensure that acts of torture are distinct offences under the law; in addition to ensuring that there is no immunity from prosecution for torture suspects. 64 85. The African Commission considers that the various impediments outlined above are a significant bar to access to local remedies and upholds the exemption of the Communication from exhaustion of local remedies. 86. On its part, Article 56(6) of the African Charter provides that the African Commission shall consider Communications which "are submitted within a reasonable period from the time domestic remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized of the matter." The African Charter does not define what constitutes "a reasonable period" of time, and for this reason, the African Commission adopts a flexible approach and treats each case on its own merits, and on a case-by-case basis.65 The purpose of this provision is to require a complainant to be vigilant and to discourage tardiness. Where local remedies are available, the timeline is considered from the delivery of final judgement issued from the highest domestic court regarding a Complainant's claim,-66 and if no local effective or sufficient remedies are available, the time starts once the Complainant realizes that there are no local effective and sufficient remedies available. 67 61 See Communication 103/93, para. 6 & Communication: 205/97 (fn 21 above). 62 Communication 147/95-149/96 (fn 13 above), para 35. ~ 63 Pg. 9-10, supplementary submission of the Complainant on file. ~ . . . ,0, 64 See Articles 4, 16 (b), 17 and 18 of the Robben Island Guidelines and Measures for the Prohigilloo~ cttPrev'entiont>t_ Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which is an authoritative interpre\a6~ oh iVis' ns of "u Article 5 of the African Charter in respect of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. s."" 65 Communication 310/05 (fn 22 above) ACHPR, para 75 & Communication 300/05 (fn 54 above). '; :_ i;; 66 Communication 333/06, (fn 41 above), para 73. z J> ' ~ 67 Communication 386/10, Dr. Farouk Mohamed Ibrahim v Sudan (2013), para 71. "- 18~ '- W,•E F-1 QI.--..,...-