24 O’HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT – DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI concern only a rule of evidence but is concerned with the existence of the fundamental right against compulsory self-incrimination ...” I fully subscribe to these words. The emergence of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in English common law can be traced back to the thirteenth century, when ecclesiastical courts began to administer what was called the “oath ex officio” to suspected heretics. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England the oath ex officio was employed even by the Court of Star Chamber to detect those who dared to criticise the king. Opposition to the oath became so widespread that there gradually emerged the common-law doctrine whereby a man had a privilege to refuse to testify against himself, not simply in respect of the special kind of procedure referred to above but, through evolution of the common law, as a principle to be upheld in ordinary criminal trials also (see the concurring opinion of Judge Walsh in Saunders, cited above). Particular attention was paid to the development of this issue by common-law legal systems and, first of all, by the authorities in the United States. In the second part of the eighteenth century the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was enacted. In so far as it relates to the issue at stake here, the amendment reads as follows: “No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The United States Supreme Court Opinion in the case of Miranda v. Arizona, delivered in 1966, was a landmark ruling concerning confessions. In that case the Supreme Court stated as follows: “... Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. ...”1 Since that time, in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, if not quite all, this Miranda rule has become a fundamental legal provision enshrined in national legislation. Now, a typical Miranda warning goes as follows: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to speak to an attorney, and to have an attorney present during any questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided for you at government expense.” The general understanding of this procedural rule is that nobody can be forced to answer questions or to give evidence that may help to prove his 1. See Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436 (1966).