O’HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 21 CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BORREGO BORREGO (Translation) Although I too voted against finding a violation, I regret that I am unable to subscribe to the approach and reasoning adopted by the majority in this judgment. In 2004 there were 216 million private motor vehicles in the European Union alone. From that we can deduce that, for all the member States of the Council of Europe, the figure could now be in excess of 400 million. Consequently, the question of road traffic, including road-traffic offences, is of very direct interest to, and has a very direct impact on, a considerable number of European citizens. In my view, while the Court should always endeavour to draft its judgments in a simple and clear manner in order to make them easier to understand, a particular effort is called for where, as in the present case, the issue is one which affects hundreds of millions of citizens. The “wider public” becomes in this instance the “even wider public”. It is true that the crucial component of a judgment is the operative provisions (the finding of a violation or no violation). However, in the present case, the route taken to arrive at the final result is, I believe, every bit as important. The present judgment sets out and explores in detail the Court’s case-law concerning the right to remain silent and not to incriminate oneself. Eight cases are cited, all of which are placed on the same footing, with the result that all the issues concerned (terrorism, drug trafficking, road-traffic offences and so on) are mixed up together. After an almost two page long citation from Jalloh v. Germany ([GC], no. 54810/00, ECHR 2006-IX), the Court attempts to justify its reasoning “[i]n the light of the principles contained in its Jalloh judgment” (see paragraph 55). I believe that the Court is on the wrong track in the present case. This is made no less true by the fact that the circumstances of the Jalloh case are very different to those of the present case (see paragraph 54) – something which, moreover, seems obvious to me – or by the fact that the examination of the Jalloh judgment (see paragraph 55) is confined to just some of the principles set out therein. To my mind, the path chosen by the Court in the present judgment follows the individualist, sacrosanct approach which views human rights as abstract rights which are set in stone. According to this school of thought, human rights are not intended to enable the individual to live in society, but to place society at the service of the individual. I do not share this view. Where human rights are concerned, we cannot and must not forget that, as far back as the French Revolution, the phrase