category or class of employers and employees from the mandatory occupational pension scheme is reasonable and constitutional. 99. In order to govern effectively, legislatures must treat different individuals and groups in different ways. To achieve true equality, it will frequently be necessary to make distinctions: see Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia (1989) 2 WWR 289. We opine that the differentiation brought about under the exemption Order does not violate equality, it merely considers the realities of the informal working sector without specifically targeting the 1st Claimant or domestic workers, generally. 100. The Court is aware that it is trite that the limitation should not negate the essential content of the right in question. ‘Essential content’ could mean the most important components of the right in question. In the case of Dr Bakili Muluzi v The Attorney General MSCA Constitutional Case Number 25 of 2018, Dr. Muluzi challenged the constitutionality of section 32 of the Corrupt Practices Act which provides on unexplained wealth. He argued that the provision reverses the legal burden of proof, the right to silence and the right of an accused person to be presumed innocent in section 42(2)(f)(iii) of the Constitution. The issue for determination was whether the provision which required a public officer who is found to be in possession of unexplained wealth, to give a satisfactory explanation to the Court how the wealth came under his control or possession negated the essential content of the right to remain silent and to be presumed innocent.1 1 In Friday A. Jumbe & Humphrey C. Mvula v Attorney General, Constitutional Case No. 1 & 2 of 2005, Katsala J. (as he then was) rejected the contention that the reverse onus created by the Corrupt Practices Act was a justifiable limitation on the right to be presumed innocent, arguing that the reverse onus provision at hand seriously impaired ‘the very essence of the right’. Page 36 of 45