mainly race, ethnicity, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion or any
other status. Recognising in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Institute for
Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v
Zimbabwe, the Commission defined discrimination as: II any act aimed at a
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference on the grounds of race, colour [...J or any
other status and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms ".49
135. As a result, in order to prove that there has been discrimination within the
meaning of the Charter, it must be shown that the differentiation concerned the
elements listed in Article 2 of the African Charter. In particular, as the African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights stated in Isiaga v. Tanzania, the right to nondiscrimination strictly prohibits differential treatment between persons in similar
circumstances on the basis of one or more of the grounds listed in Article 2 of the
African Charters" . It follows that, in the specific context of the discrimination
described by the Maputo Protocol in its Article 2, differential treatment must be
based on the sole ground of sex. In particular, the equality of women and men
must be clearly guaranteed by law.
136. In this case, the Complainants point out that the patriarchal system and
adherence to cultural practices subject women to daily discriminatory practices.
They list a ser~es of other facto:rs that tlie}':'claim exacerbate maternal health in
Nigeria. The Complainants do not show the kind of discriminatory treatment the
victims have been subjected to in relation to the grounds indicated in Article 2 of
the African Charter. In particular, in analysing their arguments and the evidence
supporting their allegations, the Committee notes that the Complainants have not
demonstrated how the patriarchal system and cultural practices have caused
differential treatment of the victims compared to the treatment accorded to other
similar categories in the san1e'sifu~tion as the victims.
137. The Complainants' argument that financial barriers prevent poor women from
accessing antenatal and intrapartum care in Nigeria and thus make it clear that
they are being discriminated against is not sufficient to find a violation of Article
2 of the African Charter or Article 2 of the Maputo Protocol. Indeed, in order to
conclude that there is discrimination, the act of differentiation must be aimed at a
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference of some kind that has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all
persons, on an equal footing, of all right
_,'-;00 '
s. In the present case, this
objective is not apparent. Indeed, while
f(j
t!B;~
aternity services exist,
it is not established that they were /1 0
articular objective of
. access b y a certam. catego J~t,
preventmg
o
i~~
I(~
'at
138. As for the Complainants' allegatio tl)
spouses of pregnant women would dis .~
"
49 Communication
50 Application
donation by the
omen who do not have
29/04.~ ZI:HR & IHRDA vi Zimbabwe (2006) ACHPR, para. 91.
032/2015, Kijiji Isiaga v United Republic of Tanzania (2018) AfCHPR para. 88,
26