A. Objection to material jurisdiction 17. The Respondent State argues that the Court does not have the jurisdiction to order the release of the Applicant and thus it should dismiss the Application for lack of material jurisdiction. 18. On his part, citing the jurisprudence of the Court in Alex Thomas v. Tanzania and Peter Joseph Chacha v. Tanzania, the Applicant avers that the Court has jurisdiction to determine this Application as it alleges violations of his rights protected by the Charter and other human rights instruments ratified by the Respondent State. *** 19. The Court recalls, as it has consistently held in accordance with Article 3(1) of the Protocol, that it has jurisdiction to consider any Application filed before it provided that the latter alleges the violation of rights guaranteed in the Charter, the Protocol or any other human rights instruments ratified by the Respondent State.3 20. In the instant case, the Applicant alleges the violation of the right to a fair trial protected under the Charter to which the Respondent State is a party. The Court thus finds that, in considering these allegations, it will be discharging its mandate to interpret and apply the Charter and other human rights instruments. 21. The Court further reiterates that pursuant to Article 27(1) of the Protocol, if it finds a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Charter or any instrument ratified by the Respondent State, it shall make appropriate orders on reparations. Furthermore, where the Court finds that the Applicant has 3 Alex Thomas v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (20 November 2015) 1 AfCLR 465, § 45; Kennedy Owino Onyachi and Charles John Mwanini Njoka v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (28 September 2017) 2 AfCLR 65, §§ 34-36; Jibu Amir alias Mussa and Said Ally Mangaya v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (28 November 2019) 3 AfCLR 629, § 18; Abdallah Sospeter Mabomba v. United Republic of Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application No. 017/2017, Judgment of 22 September 2022, § 21. 6