89. Concerning Article 56(2) of the African Charter, the Commission notes that the compatibility requirement under Article 56(2) relates to: (i) the rights-holders by whom and duty-bearers against which Communications may be brought, (ii) the substantive issues that may be invoked, (iii) the time period within which, and (iv) the place where the violation must have occurred.38 In the case of Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al vs. Cameroon,39 the Commission held that [the condition relating to compatibility with the African Charter basically requires that the Communication should be brought against a State party to the Charter; the Communication must allege prima facie violations of rights protected by the African Charter; the Communication should be brought in respect of violations that occurred after [the] State's ratification of the African Charter; or where the violations began before the State Party ratified the African Charter, have continued after such ratification. 90. In the light of these requirements, the Commission observes that the present Communication alleges a denial of access to justice and sets out, prima facie, that Articles 7 and 26 of the African Charter have been violated. The Commission also notes that the Communication is brought against States Parties to the African Charter, and alleges the violation of the rights of citizens of Zimbabwe. All the Respondent States are subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission and their territories are governed by the African Charter. The relevant Decisions of the SADC Summit which are alleged to have been collectively taken by the Respondent States and which form the basis of the alleged ongoing violation of the denial of access to justice, were adopted in Namibia and Mozambique, respectively, and operate in the territories of all the Respondent States; all of which are governed by the African Charter. The African Commission therefore holds that the requirements under Article 56(2) have been fulfilled. 91. With respect to Article 56(3) of the African Charter, the Commission notes Tanzania's submission that paragraphs 21, 22, 24 - 26 and 29 of the Communication is written in "disparaging language or insulting language directed at the member states of SADC". The Commission refers to its interpretation of these terminologies in [b]Communication 268/03 - Ilesanmi / Nigeria[/b]40 and [b]Communication 284/03 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe / Zimbabwe[/b],41 where it held respectively that "... disparaging means "to speak slightingly of... or to belittle and insulting means to abuse scornfully or to offend the self respect or modesty of...". The language must be aimed at undermining the integrity and status of the institution and bring (sic) it into disrepute"42 and "insulting means to abuse scornfully or to offend the self respect or modesty of..."43 92. Furthermore, the Commission has held in the above referenced [b]Communication 284/03[/b[/i],44 inter alia that: [i]in determining whether a certain remark is disparaging or insulting and whether it has dampened the integrity of the judiciary, the Commission has to satisfy itself whether the said remark or language is aimed at unlawfully and intentionally violating the dignity, reputation or integrity of a judicial officer or body and whether it is used in a manner calculated to pollute the minds of the public or any reasonable man to cast aspersions on and weaken public confidence on the administration of justice. The language must be aimed at undermining the integrity and status of the institution and bring it into disrepute. To this end, Article 56(3) must be interpreted bearing in mind Article 9(2) of the African Charter which provides that 'every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law'. A balance must be struck between the right to speak freely and the duty to protect state institutions to ensure that while discouraging abusive language, the African Commission is not at the same time violating or inhibiting the enjoyment of other rights guaranteed in the African Charter, such as in this case, the right to freedom of expression.[Emphasis added].45 93. In view of the above interpretation, it is the opinion of the Commission that the terminologies challenged by Tanzania in the present Communication are not insulting or disparaging in the manner contemplated by the provision of Article 56 (3). Words such as "ulterior purpose", "violator" and "irrational and that is has been made in bad faith" would be nothing but mere allegations, depicting, as they perceive it, the Complainant/Victims??? perception of the facts which form the basis of the allegations and fears upon which the Communication is founded. They have been used to describe a situation which has been condemned and which would be difficult to describe differently.46 94. In this light, the Commission wishes to distinguish the words used in the present Communication, for instance, from those used in the case of LigueCamerounaise des Droits de l'Homme v Cameroon47 , referenced by Tanzania, where the Commission condemned the use of words such as "Paul Biya must respond [sic] to crimes against humanity"; "30 years of the criminal neo-colonial regime incarnated by the duo Ahidjio/Biya"; "regime of torturers"; and "government barbarisms", as insulting language.48 On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission holds that the requirement under Article 56(3) has been complied 10