16 LETELLIER v. FRANCE JUDGMENT and 5 December 1986 (see paragraphs 13 and 23 above) regarded detention on remand as the sole means of countering it. After 23 December 1986 in any event (see paragraph 23 above), the continued detention was therefore no longer justified under this head. 2. The danger of absconding 40. The various decisions of the Paris indictments division (see paragraphs 13, 16, 18 and 23 above) were based on the fear of the applicant’s evading trial because of "the severity of the sentence to which she was liable at law" and on the need to ensure that she remained at the disposal of the judicial authorities. 41. The Commission observed that during the four weeks for which she had been released - from 24 December 1985 to 22 January 1986 - the applicant had complied with the obligations of court supervision and had not sought to abscond. To do so would, moreover, have been difficult for her, as the mother of minor children and the manager of a business representing her sole source of income. As the danger of absconding had not been apparent from the outset, the decisions given had contained inadequate statements of reasons in so far as they had mentioned no circumstance capable of establishing it. 42. The Government considered that there was indeed a danger of the accused’s absconding. They referred to the severity of the sentence which Mrs Letellier risked and the evidence against her. They also put forward additional considerations which were not however invoked in the judicial decisions in question. 43. The Court points out that such a danger cannot be gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the sentence risked. It must be assessed with reference to a number of other relevant factors which may either confirm the existence of a danger of absconding or make it appear so slight that it cannot justify detention pending trial (see, mutatis mutandis, the Neumeister judgment cited above, Series A no. 8, p. 39, § 10). In this case the decisions of the indictments divisions do not give the reasons why, notwithstanding the arguments put forward by the applicant in support of her applications for release, they considered the risk of her absconding to be decisive (see paragraphs 14, 19 and 24 above). 3. The inadequacy of court supervision 44. According to the applicant, court supervision would have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued. Furthermore, she had been under such supervision without any problems arising for nearly one month, from 24 December 1985 to 22 January 1986 (see paragraphs 12-13 above), and had declared her readiness to accept it on each occasion that she sought her release (see paragraphs 14, 19 and 24 above).