date set by the Court as being the commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seized with the matter.” 56. The Court recalls, that: “…the reasonableness of the timeframe for seizure depends on the specific circumstances of the case and should be determined on a case-by-case basis.”12 57. In the instant Application, the Court observes that the judgment of the Court of Appeal on the merits in Civil Appeal no. 175, The Attorney General v. Dickson Paul Sanga13 was delivered on 5 August 2020. The Court notes that three (3) months and fifteen (15) days elapsed between 5 August 2020 and 18 November 2020 when the Applicants filed the Application before this Court. The issue for determination, therefore, is whether the period that the Applicants took to file the Application before the Court is reasonable. 58. The Court notes that the filing of the Application within three (3) months and fifteen (15) days after exhaustion of local remedies was expeditious and therefore reasonable. Resultantly, the Court rejects the objection herein based on non-filing of the Application within a reasonable time and holds that the Application has complied with the requirement of Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules. iii. Objection on the basis that the matter has already been settled 59. The Respondent State submits that the viability of Section 148(5) of the CPA, was heard and determined in the case of Anaclet Paulo v. Tanzania and that therefore, the present Application contravenes the provision of Article 56(7) of the Charter. 60. The Respondent State cites the Commission’s decision in Amnesty International v. Tunisia, arguing that the communication was declared inadmissible owing to the fact that the same subject matter was pending at 12 13 Zongo v. Burkina Faso (merits), supra, § 92. See also Thomas v. Tanzania (merits) supra, § 73. Supra note 13. 15