they are in accordance with the standards set out in the Charter or any other human rights instruments ratified by the State concerned.”11 51. In this regard, the Court holds that the Applicants have complied with the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies under Article 56(5) of the Charter. Consequently, the Court dismisses the objection herein. ii. Objection on the basis that the Application was not filed within a reasonable time 52. According to the Respondent State, the Applicants have not met the requirement of Article 56(6) of the Charter in relation to the filing the Application within a reasonable time after exhaustion of local remedies “since the Applicants did not exhaust local remedies”. 53. The Respondent State contends that there is a pending application for review before its Court of Appeal which negates the assertion by the Applicants that they have exhausted local remedies. 54. The Applicants argue that in spite of the impediments occasioned by the coronavirus, they filed the Application on 18 November 2020, which constitutes a period of “two months” after exhaustion of local remedies on 5 August 2020, the date of the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Dickson Paul Sanga’s case. *** 55. The Court notes that Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules which in substance restates Article 56(6) of the Charter, requires an Application to be filed within: “a reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted or from the 11 Kenedy Ivan v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (March 2019) 3 AfCLR 48, § 26; Armand Guehi v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 477, § 33; Nguza Viking (Babu Seya) and Johnson Nguza (Papi Kocha) v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (23 March 2018) 2 AfCLR 287, § 35. 14