communication. 90. The Complainant claims that when interpreting Article 56(5) of the Charter, the African Commission should take into consideration generally recognised principles of international law in the interest of ensuring the protection of human rights.5 91. The Complainant submits that the Commission has unequivocally held that when a Respondent State raises the defence of non exhaustion of local remedies, it must discharge the burden by demonstrating the existence of such remedies."6 92. The Complainant urges the African Commission to draw inspiration from regional and international human rights mechanisms on this issue. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has repeatedly affirmed that a state has duties "to organise the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of judicially ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights." 7 The Court held that "the State claiming non-exhaustion of domestic remedies has an obligation to prove that the domestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective."8 93. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights expressly stated that the burden of proving that effective local remedies exist and that they had not been exhausted fell upon the government making such a claim.9 94. A similar view regarding the burden of proof was taken by the United Nations Human Rights Committee whereby a Respondent State "...had failed to provide.... sufficient information on effective remedies."10 Equally, the European Court and Commission of Human Rights have held that the government shoulders the burden of proving that there are effective remedies. 95. Similarly, the Grand Chamber of the European Court for Human Rights has expressed the opinion that "it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion of domestic remedies to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time."11 The Court continued:" ...that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success."12 Only once this burden of proof has been met does the petitioner have to establish that the local remedy "was in fact exhausted or for some reason inadequate or ineffective in the particular circumstances."13 96. The Complainant urges the Commission to apply the standards articulated above, which require the Respondent State to prove that effective local remedies exist in Sudan and that they are reasonably accessible. The Complainant submits further that it is evident that the Respondent State has not met this burden of proof. It has not shown that the refugees had adequate and effective remedies. The Government had itself prevented refugees accessing any remedies - irrespective of their effectiveness and adequacy that it alleges are available. 97. The Complainant submits that communication 235/00 involves massive and serious violations of human rights. He states that the African Commission has found that actions threatening the life and welfare of less than a thousand people amount to serious and massive violations of human rights.14 98. The Complainant alleges that the present communication involves more than fourteen thousand (14,000) Ethiopian Refugees, whose daily survival is threatened and who cannot approach the authorities for fear that their refugee identity documents would be confiscated and they would be deported without the due process of law. 99. The Complainant states that the Respondent State has suggested that the refugees could have theoretically relied on Administrative and Constitutional procedures in "Article 20 of the 1996 Constitutional and Administrative code, and in accordance with Article 120 (2)(b) of the Constitution." The Complainant alleges that this would not have been an adequate remedy because the Judiciary in Sudan is not independent. 100. The Complainant points to the fact that the Commission noted that the Respondent State had dismissed over 100 judges when it came to power approximately twelve years earlier.15 The Complainant further alleges that since 1989, the appointment of Judges is done in close coordination with the President. The Complainant goes on to state that the 1998 Constitution of Sudan intentionally enhanced the powers of the President.16 101. The Complainant alleges that on 12th December 1999, the President declared a State of Emergency and prolonged his control over the Judiciary until 2001. Cases brought to the Court challenging this declaration of emergency have been dismissed with little or no attention to international human rights law. Instead the Courts have relied on vague references to customary presidential powers that override the clear words of the Constitution.17 The Complainant concludes that the Sudanese Courts have been under the control of the Sudanese Executive since 1989, and that an independent judiciary does not exist in 7