proposed them cannot be of any consequence whatsoever, according to the Respondent State, since they stay appointed for a fixed term of office. 159. The Respondent State notes also that the Chairperson of the Central Electoral Commission is elected for a six-year term which is not renewable. It, therefore, contends that the Chairperson is under no obligation to manage the institution in such a way that would win him favours and assure the renewal of his term. This individual safeguard of independence of the Chairperson also results in a higher level of independence of the institution itself, according to the Respondent State. 160. Lastly, the Respondent State asserts that the legal reform it carried out to comply with the judgment of the Court in APDH v Céte d'Ivoire (merits) resulted in a balanced composition of the electoral body. The Respondent State notes that it removed the representatives of the President of the National Assembly and of the Minister of the Economy and Finance. It also added two representatives from CSOs which now constitutes the largest group within the electoral body with its six (6) members, which further guarantees its impartiality and independence. It also reduced the number of political parties’ representatives from the ruling party from four (4) members proposed by opposition to three (3) members while retaining four (4) members parties. The result of these amendments is that the composition of the electoral body is not dominated by any political group, either by those in power or from the opposition. 161. The Respondent State did not make any submissions regarding the allegations by the Applicants that the composition of the electoral body remains imbalanced at the Local levels. tek 162. When considering the issue of the composition of the electoral body and its relationship to independence and impartiality of electoral body, the Court takes note of the international human rights instruments and relevant jurisprudence governing this issue. Specifically, the Court takes into consideration Article 17 of the ACDEG, Article 3 of the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol and the Court’s 35