36.
The Applicants submit that the Application submitted to this Court only concerns
violations contained in human rights instruments to which the Respondent State
is a State Party, specifically the Charter, the Protocol, the ACDEG, the ECOWAS
Democracy Protocol, and the ICCPR. Therefore, according to them the Court has
material jurisdiction to hear the case.
37.
Furthermore,
the Applicants dispute the arguments
of the Respondent State
concerning the Court's jurisdiction to interpret and apply Article 30 of the Protocol.
They contend that to answer the question whether the Court has jurisdiction to
rule on the execution of its own judgments, an important distinction needs to be
made between whether the judgment to be executed has led to a new dispute
submitted to the Court or not.
38.
The Applicants observe that pursuant to Article 29(2) of the Protocol, judgments
rendered by the Court are notified to the Council of Ministers (hereinafter referred
to as the “Executive Council’) which is responsible for ensuring their execution.
39.
Based
on
an examination
of the provisions
of the Charter,
the Rules and the
Protocol, the Applicants concede that the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the
execution or non-execution of its judgements. Therefore, the Court cannot rule
on the compliance of possible legal reforms ordered in a judgment such as those
imposed in the judgment in APDH v Céte d'ivoire (merits). The Court can only
report to the Assembly.
40.
Similarly,
if at the
expiration
of the
time
limit
imposed
by
the
Court
the
Respondent State has not begun any kind of reform, the Applicants maintain that
the Court cannot demand the Respondent State to execute its judgment.
41.
However, the Applicants claim that the situation is different when new Applicants
refer a new
law to the Court; especially,
when
the adoption
of that new law
resulted from the Respondent State’s intention to execute the respective order
by the Court.
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