NEUMEISTER v. AUSTRIA JUDGMENT 31 problem in question to have played no part at the hearing in July 1964 on the admissibility of the Application. Moreover, the Government considers that the words "reasonable time" mean the same thing in both Articles in which they appear, namely Articles 5 (3) and 6 (1) (art. 5-3, art. 6-1). The time to be considered in connection with Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1) is said to have begun not with Neumeister’s first interrogation by the Investigating Judge (on 21 January 1960) but only when the indictment was preferred (on 17 March 1964). The terms "criminal charge" and "accusation" are in fact said to refer, in both the Continental and the AngloAmerican systems, to the legal act of requesting the Court to rule on whether the allegation that an individual has committed a punishable offence is well-founded. The Government remarks that under the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, only a person against whom an "Anklage" has been filed is entitled to a hearing before an independent tribunal. In its view adoption of the Commission’s interpretation of the point would have results incompatible with the aims of the Convention: the effect would be to prevent the cessation of prosecution before the trial was opened, whereas several national legal systems, in particular Sections 90, 189 and 227 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, allow this. Such an interpretation would also conflict with paragraphs 3 (a) and 2 of Article 6 (art. 6-3-a, art. 6-2): it is difficult to see how a person against whom a mere enquiry or preliminary investigation (Vorverhandlungen) is opened can be informed in detail "of the nature and cause of the accusation against him"; as for the principle of presumption of innocence, it is said to apply solely to an individual against whom a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1) has been brought - as indeed the Commission itself is affirmed to have acknowledged on many occasions. Neither does the Government share the opinion expressed by the Commission that the time covered by Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1) runs at least up to the determination of the criminal charge by the court of first instance. It maintains that in fact that time comes to an end as soon as the accused receives a "hearing", i.e. at the beginning of the trial. On this point the Government stresses the contrast between Article 6 (1) and Article 5 (3) (art. 6-1, art. 5-3), which contains the word "jugée" ("trial" in the English text). It adds that in the English version of Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1) the drafters of the Convention would have used the words "for the determination" instead of "in the determination" if their intention had really been to require a decision to be reached on each charge within a reasonable time. Lastly, the Government complains that the Commission merely states that some of the criteria which it applied in relation to Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) also hold good for Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1), without indicating what facts it