MORICE v. FRANCE JUDGMENT 25 done” (see De Cubber, cited above, § 26). What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public. Thus, any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw (see Castillo Algar v. Spain, 28 October 1998, § 45, Reports 1998-VIII, and Micallef, cited above, § 98). 2. Application of those principles in the present case 79. In the present case, the fear of a lack of impartiality lay in the fact that Judge J.M., who sat on the Court of Cassation bench which adopted the judgment of 10 December 2009, had expressed his support for Judge M. nine years earlier, in the context of disciplinary proceedings that had been brought against her on account of her conduct in the “Scientology” case. Speaking as a judge and a colleague in the same court, in the course of a general meeting of judges of the Paris tribunal de grande instance on 4 July 2000, at which he had subsequently voted in favour of the motion of support for Judge M., J.M. had stated: “We are not prohibited, as grassroots judges, from saying that we stand by Judge [M.]. It is not forbidden to say that Judge [M.] has our support and trust” (see paragraphs 27-28 above). 80. The Grand Chamber notes at the outset that the applicant acknowledged in his observations that it was not established that Judge J.M. had displayed any personal bias against him. He argued merely that regardless of his personal conduct, the very presence of J.M. on the bench created a situation which rendered his fears objectively justified and legitimate (see paragraph 67 above). 81. In the Court’s view, the case must therefore be examined from the perspective of the objective impartiality test, and more specifically it must address the question whether the applicant’s doubts, stemming from the specific situation, may be regarded as objectively justified in the circumstances of the case. 82. Accordingly, the Court firstly takes the view that the language used by Judge J.M. in support of a fellow judge, Judge M., who was precisely responsible for the bringing of criminal proceedings against the applicant in the case now in issue, was capable of raising doubts in the defendant’s mind as to the impartiality of the “tribunal” hearing his case. 83. Admittedly, the Government argued in their observations, among other things, that the remarks by J.M. were not sufficient to establish a lack of objective impartiality on his part, as they had been made a long time before and the words used reflected a personal position which concerned only the conditions in which the information regarding the bringing of disciplinary proceedings against a colleague of the same court had been forthcoming. 84. The Court takes the view, however, that the very singular context of the case cannot be overlooked. It would firstly point out that the case concerned a lawyer and a judge, who had been serving in that capacity in