subjective because statements that could be disparaging or insulting to one person may not be seen in the same light by another person.' 59. In Ilesanmi v Nigeria, the Commission defined disparaging as "to speak slightingly of. .. or belittle" and insulting as "to abuse scornfully or to offend the selfrespect or modesty of someone or an institution"> Furthermore, in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights v Zimbabwe, the Commission stated that "in determining whether a certain remark is disparaging or insulting and whether it has dampened the integrity of the judiciary or any other state institution, the Commission has to satisfy itself 'whether the remark of language is aimed at unlawfully and intentionally violating the dignity, reputation or integrihj of a judicial officer or body and whether it is used in a manner calculated to pollute the minds of the public or any reasonable man to cast aspersions on and weaken public confidence in the institution. The language must be aimed at undermining the integrity and status of the institution and bring in into disrepute:" 60. In terms of specific language used, in Ligue camerounaise des droits de l'Homme v. Cameroon, the Commission declared the use of expressions such as "regime of torturers" and "barbaric government," as insulting language," 61. Based on the jurisprudence of the Commission, and perusing the submissions of the Complainant, can one effectively say that the Complainant's submissions were wilful, with a purpose of insulting, offending or disparaging, with an intent to jeopardize the integrity or reputation of the Judge ... ? 62. In the present Communication, the Commission considers that the assertions by the Complainant that the Judge was biased was formulated in a conditional manner and in context to his experience during the cross-examination process. Thus, a wilful intention to undermine the integrity of the Judge cannot be inferred from his submissions. To this end, the Complainant described and demonstrated the context of the trial and the judge's behaviour which he believes showed bias and criticizes the Judge's behaviour, without referring to the judicial system as a whole. In addition, the fact that the Complainant did not raise the issue of the Judge's bias before the Appeal Court does not prevent him from invoking the same before the Commission. 63. The Commission opines that the language used by the Complainant cannot be considered insulting or disparaging within the context of Article 56(3) of the African Charter, and therefore holds that the Respondent State's allegation that the Communication be declared inadmissible for non-compliance with Article 56 (3) is untenable.