63. The Court, therefore, dismisses the Applicant’s allegation and finds that the Respondent State has not violated his right to be heard, protected under Article 7(1) of the Charter. B. Alleged violation of the right to life 64. The Applicant alleges that the Respondent State in imposing on him the death penalty, sentenced him to an unconstitutional, inhuman and uncultured punishment in violation of his rights. * 65. The Respondent State disputes the Applicant’s allegation and submits that that the issue of constitutionality of the death sentence in the country was one of the grounds of appeal advanced by the Applicant which was determined in the Court of Appeal. It further notes that the death penalty is provided for in the Respondent State’s statutes as a punishment for murder. Specifically, the Respondent State refers to Section 197 of its Penal Code, which states as follows: “A person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to death”. 66. The Respondent State also refers to the decision of its Court of Appeal in Mbushuu alias Dominic Mnyaroje and Another v Republic [1995] TLR 97, in which it was stated that: “… the death penalty as provided by s 197 of the Penal Code … is not arbitrary, hence a lawful law and it is reasonably necessary and it is thus saved by art 30(2) of the Constitution; the death penalty is, therefore, not unconstitutional.” 67. The Respondent State further refers to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as the “ICCPR”) and contends that it is clear that the death penalty is not prohibited by the ICCPR, to which it is a party.23 The Respondent State maintains that 23 The Respondent State became a State Party to the ICCPR on 11 June 1976. 17