The Applicant further argued that there are effective and efficient remedies under section 14(6) of the Immigration Act No. 7 of 1995 (the Act) which provides as follows: "A deportation order shall remain in force the period specified therein, unless sooner varied or revoked by the Minister, or, if no period is so specified, until varied or revoked by the Minister." Learned Counsel for the Applicant contended, in this regard, that any deportation order made by the Minister of Immigration under section 14(6) of the Act may be subject to a judicial review in the court system of the Applicant. The Respondents aver that they had exhausted all available remedies but did not adduce any evidence in support of their averments. Further, it was stated on their behalf that since the deportation of the third Respondent, they could not seek any remedy within the territory of the Applicant. We consider, however, that the Respondents did not explore all legal avenues for contesting the deportation order made by the Tanzanian Minister of Immigration. Deportation alone, in our view, does not amount to denial of access to the courts within the Applicant's territory. The third Respondent could, in our opinion, have hired the services of legal advisers in the territory of the Applicant, without being physically present therein, in order to challenge by judicial review the deportation order made against him, if he had so wished. We hold, therefore, that the Respondents had not exhausted local remedies and do not have locus standi to institute proceedings before the Tribunal. We turn now to the second preliminary objection raised by the Applicant, namely, that the deportation order made against the third Respondent should be rescinded. The Applicant asserted that the thrust of its objection is that issues pertaining to admission and expulsion of aliens and expulsion rested, within its powers. It was further submitted on its behalf that it is an established principle of international law that a state has a right to admit an alien and also has the power to expel any alien from its territory on account of a breach of applicable laws within its territory. John Dugart SC in his book "Territory and International law: A South African Perspective", 3rd edition, (2005), states as follows at pages 295 and 296: "An individual has no right of entry to a state of which (...) is not a national. If (...) admitted, (...)may be expelled; but mistreatment is not permitted in the process of expulsion. . . According to article 13 × An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority. of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights a person facing expulsion is entitled to submit reasons against (...) expulsion and to have (...) case reviewed by a competent authority "except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require." Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, Resolution 40/144, (1985); read together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international instruments, constitute the minimum standard for the treatment of aliens. According to John Dugard, at page 298 "these principles include non-discrimination on grounds of race, the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the right to a fair trial." The Respondents also claim that during the process of the third Respondent's deportation he was subject to torture. Article 1 (1) × For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include 3