shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them." According to the Amicus Curiae's submissions, the Respondent State is bound by the African Charter but had failed to give effect to many of the rights, duties, and freedoms guaranteed by the African Charter through the passage and application of the Anti-Terror Statute. The Amicus Curiae further submitted that, in particular, the Anti-Terror Statute's definition of terrorism violates several sections of the African Charter and that it has been applied in such a way as to sanction arbitrary arrests for non-terrorist acts and the subsequent torture and/ or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees. 227. Relying on the provisions of Articles 6, 9(2), and 11 of the African Charter, the Amicus Curiae submitted that it was clear that the overly vague definition of terrorism found in the Anti-Terror Statute had been used to arrest and detain those within Ethiopia attempting to invoke their right of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly under Articles 6, 9(2) and 11 of the African Charter. 228. The Amicus Curiae's submissions alluded to the Commission's decision in Monim Elgak and Others v Sudunw and Interights and Others v Iviauritaniat' to the effect that the AntiTerror Statute does not meet the criteria that a law must be sufficiently accessible to individuals and adequately precise to provide notice regarding what actions are proscribed and what rights are limited as it fails to provide individuals with adequate notice that their actions would be considered criminal. 229. The Amicus Curiae's submissions acknowledged that the need to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism is a legitimate aim. However, the Amicus Curiae submitted that Article 3 of the Anti-Terror Statute criminalizes activities that are well outside any understanding of an act of terrorism, including peaceful protest. 230. The Amicus Curiae also submitted that the criteria that a limitation in a statue must be proportional to the nature of the objective of the law, that is, that the law should not be more restrictive than what is necessary to achieve the legitimate aim for a restriction on freedom to be justifiable has been violated as the Anti-Terror Statute imposes the most severe penalties (lengthy imprisonment and potential capital punishment) upon protected activities and otherwise minor criminal offenses, such as causing property damage. In this regard, the Amicus Curiae submitted that the Anti-Terror Statute fails to meet the high criteria prescribed for a legitimate limitation of the African Charter rights under Article 27 thereof and therefore cannot legitimatize violations of the Articles 6, 9(2), and 11 of the African Charter. 231. The essence of the Amicus Curiae's submissions was that the definition of "terrorist acts" contained in the Anti-Terror Statute is overboard, imprecise, and impermissibly restricts the fundamental rights protected by the African Charter and other international human rights treaties to which the Respondent State is bound. The Commission's analysis on the Merits 232. Before delving into the analysis of the merits of this Communication, it is imper'~~....._ that the Commission deals with the issues raised by the Respondent State which ha",e.\ol'.o... ". been set out in paragraph 194 above. f! ~ ~ o~): '. ~ ~\ ~ I~ ~ Communication 379/09 - Monim Elgak:and Others v Sudan, para 118. 41 Communication 242/10 - lnterights and Others v Mauritania, (2010) para 78. 40 « . ,-.j 1"). p.u.u~ "5 "( r') '1 ~.s'.sl ~l' ~'-~,:,v' A.,., I.Q<J c'lt:,,\ " (. >.01\' ...~" \,\' Oo\fMr [l '\ ~'\ ()I'. -...;,;:;:~~-::::.:-. :