*** 47. The Court notes that pursuant to Article 56(5) of the Charter, whose provisions are restated in Rule 50(2)(e) of the Rules, any application filed before it shall fulfil the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies, unless the same are unavailable, ineffective and insufficient or unless the domestic proceedings thereof are unduly prolonged. The rule of exhaustion of local remedies aims at providing states the opportunity to resolve cases of alleged human rights violations within their internal system before an international human rights body is called upon to determine the State’s responsibility for same.11 48. Regarding the Respondent State’s argument that the Applicant was required to file an application for review of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Court has consistently held that this remedy in the Respondent State’s judicial system is an extraordinary remedy that the Applicant is not required to exhaust prior to seizing this Court.12 49. In the present case, the Court notes that the Applicant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, the highest judicial organ of the Respondent State, was decided upon when the said Court dismissed it in its judgment of 10 June 1999 and upheld the judgment of the High Court. The Respondent State thus had the opportunity to address the alleged violations raised by the Applicant which allegedly ensued from his trials and his appeal. 50. As regards the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court notes that the Applicant’s case was decided by three courts, namely the District Court, the High Court sitting in Sumbawanga and the Court of Appeal sitting in Mbeya, in Case No. 6 of 1998. The Court of Appeal, which is the highest court in the Respondent state, dismissed the case. 11 12 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya (merits), supra, §§ 93-94. Christopher Jonas v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (28 September 2017) 2 AfCLR 101, § 44. 13