25. With regard to the second limb of the objection, the Court reiterates that pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Protocol, it is empowered to make appropriate orders on reparations, if it finds a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Charter or any instrument ratified by the Respondent State. Furthermore, the Court may make an order for restitution, where it finds that an applicant has demonstrated specific and compelling circumstances warranting such an order. Consequently, the Court observes that issuing an order to quash and set aside an applicant’s conviction and sentence where the requirements are met is well within its jurisdiction. The second limb of the objection is thus equally dismissed. 26. In light of the above, the Court dismisses the Respondent State’s objection and finds that it has material jurisdiction to consider the present Application. B. Objection to temporal jurisdiction 27. The Respondent State objects to the temporal jurisdiction of the Court arguing that the alleged violations occurred prior to the ratification of the Protocol. It further submits that the alleged violations are not ongoing. He avers that the Applicant is serving a lawful sentence for the commission of an offence as provided by statute. * 28. The Applicant argues that he is incarcerated on death row and that therefore he is in a situation of extreme gravity with a strong likelihood of suffering irreparable harm. In this regard, he argues that the alleged violations are of a continuing nature and therefore the Court is vested with temporal jurisdiction to hear this case. *** 29. The Court notes that, in accordance with the principle of non-retroactivity of law, it cannot examine allegations of human rights violations that occurred before the entry into force of the obligations arising from instruments to 8