00{,r{3 clainred by the Applicant and the bases of their calculation; the rnoment when the Applicant's expectation$ aro$e; the lump surn nature of this type of reparation; the particular circumstances of the ease (the financial capacity of the Applicant; his knowledge of the business world and his reputation); the random nature of any cornmercial activity; as well as the criteria of falrness and reasonable proportionality [paragraphs 61 ts 66 of the Judgement]. 6" !t is precisely the reasonable nature of the amount granted which however pose$ a problem. ln rny opinicn, in its assessmentof this decisive criterion, the Court ornitted: (i) to give the full weight it deserves ts the randsrn nature of the investment project initiated by the Applicant, and {ii} to take into consideration the am*unts claimed by the same Applicant in regard to other clainTs for reparation for material prejudice. 7. Regarding fhe randorn nature af the Cppllbanfs invesfment project, it would have been necessary, in my view, to seriously consider that the said project was still at the embryonic staga, and that as the Court itself adrnits, "the sale of petroleunr products under the afaresaid proiects, had not taken off' {paragraph 55 of the Judgement}" At this stage and under such conditions, an investor may make fabulous plans which may or may not materialize. ?he investor may gain or lose as well" These forecasts are only * view af the rnind. The observation is valid for atl investments, and there wa$ no proof that the oil sector would be an exception. We cannot therefore rely on thi* type of projections, to rnake a rel*able calculation, even if it means granting implicitly a given percentage of the amount claimed. 8, As regards consideration of fhe amor.rnfs claimad by tt:e same Applicant in relation ta the other clairns far reparation for rnaferial prejudice, the Court, in my opinion" ought to have eonsidered, a$ a somparison, the amount that the sailne Applicant clairned for reparation for loss of profit and devaluation of shares in relation to hi$ companies, sternming frorn the violation of his rights. From this dual perspective, the Applicant clairns a total amount of around $ix Billlon CFA Francs (4 359 661 765 + 1 9S0 526 692 = 6 320 188 457i, and the Court, based on evidence, granted hirn these amounts, and rlghtly so [paragraphs 38 and 42 af the Judgement]. Frorn thereon, it is difficult to understand how sorneone who claims, justifiably so, a reparation of an amcunt of around Six Billion CFA Francs for damages concerning his cornpanies which have been functioning for many year$ and were very prosperous (making him a "great businessrnan" and a "business magnate" in the country), can at lhe same time claim, for a project which is still at the level of negotiation and which has not gCIne operational, reparation of an amount about twenty five tirnes higher [One Hundred and Fifty Billion], and that the Court goes as far granting him an amount about frye finaes higher [Thirty Billion]l How can we still consider, in the circurnstances, such an amount as being reasonable, equltable and proportionate? Asking the question is already answering it. ?