85 In a similar vein, the Judge Advocate noted in Schonfeld that: if several persons combine for an unlawful purpose or for a lawful purpose to be effected by unlawful means, and one of them in carrying out that purpose, kills a man, it is murder in all who are present […] provided that the death was caused by a member of the party in the course of his endeavours to effect the common object of the assembly.238 199. It can be noted that some cases appear broadly to link the notion of common purpose to that of causation. In this regard, the Ponzano case, 239 which concerned the killing of four British prisoners of war in violation of the rules of warfare, can be mentioned. Here, the Judge Advocate adopted the approach suggested by the Prosecutor, 240 and stressed: [...] the requirement that an accused, before he can be found guilty, must have been concerned in the offence. [T]o be concerned in the commission of a criminal offence […] does not only mean that you are the person who in fact inflicted the fatal injury and directly caused death, be it by shooting or by any other violent means; it also means an indirect degree of participation [ …]. [I]n other words, he must be the cog in the wheel of events leading up to the result which in fact occurred. He can further that object not only by giving orders for a criminal offence to be committed, but he can further that object by a variety of other means […]. 241 Further on, the Judge Advocate submitted that while the defendant’s involvement in the criminal acts must form a link in the chain of causation, it was not necessary that his participation be a sine qua non, or that the offence would not have occurred but for his participation. 242 Consonant with the twin requirements of criminal responsibility under this category, however, the Judge Advocate stressed the necessity of knowledge on the part of the accused as to the intended purpose of the criminal enterprise. 243 238 th th Trial of Franz Schonfeld and others, British Military Court, Essen, June 11 -26 , 1946, UNWCC, vol. XI, p. 68 (summing up of the Judge Advocate). 239 Trial of Feurstein and others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Hamburg, Germany (4-24 August, 1948), judgement of 24 August 1948 (original transcripts in Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond; on file with the International Tribunal’s Library). 240 The Prosecutor had stated the following: “It is an opening principle of English law, and indeed of all law, that a man is responsible for his acts and is taken to intend the natural and normal consequences of his acts and if these men […] set the machinery in motion by which the four men were shot, then they are guilty of the crime of killing these men. It does not – it never has been essential for any one of these men to have taken those soldiers out themselves and to have personally executed them or personally dispatched them. That is not at all necessary; all that is necessary to make them responsible is that they set the machinery in motion which ended in the volleys that killed the four men we are concerned with” (ibid., p. 4). 241 Ibid., summing up of the Judge Advocate, p. 7. 242 In this regard, the Judge Advocate noted that: “[o]f course, it is quite possible that it [the criminal offence] might have taken place in the absence of all these accused here, but that does not mean the same thing as saying […] that [the accused] could not be a chain in the link of causation […]” (ibid., pp. 7-8). 243 In particular, it was held that in order to be “concerned in the commission of a criminal offence,” it was necessary to prove: Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999