80 Jaski}i could have been the “unauthorized and unforeseen act of one of the force that entered Sivci”. 2. The Individual Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for the Killings (a) Article 7(1) of the Statute and the Notion of Common Purpose 185. The question therefore arises whether under international criminal law the Appellant can be held criminally responsible for the killing of the five men from Jaski}i even though there is no evidence that he personally killed any of them. The two central issues are: (i) whether the acts of one person can give rise to the criminal culpability of another where both participate in the execution of a common criminal plan; and (ii) what degree of mens rea is required in such a case. 186. The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa). In national legal systems this principle is laid down in Constitutions, 228 in laws, 229 or in judicial decisions. 230 In international criminal law the principle is laid down, inter alia, in Article 7(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal which states that: A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. (emphasis added) This provision is aptly explained by the Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of the International Tribunal, which states the following: 228 An example is provided by Article 27 para. 1 of the Italian Constitution (“La responsibilità penale è personale.” (“Criminal responsibility is personal.”) (unofficial translation)). 229 See for instance Article 121-1 of the French Code pénal (“Nul n’est responsable pénalement que de son propre fait”), para. 4 of the Austrian Strafgesetzbuch (“Strafbar ist nur, wer schuldhaft handelt” (“Only he who is culpable may be punished”) (unofficial translation)). 230 This rather basic proposition is usually tacitly assumed rather than explicitly acknowledged. For an example of where it was expressly stated, however, see, for Great Britain, R. v. Dalloway (1847) 3 Cox CC 273. See also the various decisions of the German Constitutional Court, e.g., BverfGE 6, 389 (439) and 50, 125 (133), as well as decisions of the German Federal Court of Justice (e.g., BGHSt 2, 194 (200)). Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999