67 charged by the FRY authorities to commit particular acts or to carry out particular tasks of some kind, it concluded that “without evidence of orders having been received from Belgrade which circumvented or overrode the authority of the Corps Commander, those acts cannot be said to have been carried out ‘on behalf of’ the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).” 190 153. The Appeals Chamber holds that to have required proof of specific orders circumventing or overriding superior orders not only applies the wrong test but is also questionable in this context. A distinguishing feature of the VJ and the VRS was that they possessed shared military objectives. As a result, it is inherently unlikely that orders from Belgrade circumventing or overriding the authority of local Corps commanders would have ever been necessary as these forces were of the same mind; a point that appears to have been virtually conceded by the Trial Chamber. 191 154. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber, noting that the pay of all 1st Krajina Corps officers and presumably of all senior VRS Commanders as former JNA officers continued to be received from Belgrade after 19 May 1992, acknowledged that a possible conclusion with regard to individuals, is that payment could well “be equated with control”. 192 The Trial Chamber nevertheless dismissed such continuity of command structures, logistical organization, strategy and tactics as being “as much matters of convenience as military communications link for everyday use was established and maintained between VRS Main Staff Headquarters and the VJ Main Staff in Belgrade […].” 190 Ibid., para. 601. 191 The Trial Chamber noted that: “?igt is clear from the evidence that the military and political objectives of the Republika Srpska and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were largely complementary. […g The […] political leadership of the Republika Srpska and their senior military commanders no doubt considered the success of the overall Serbian war effort as a prerequisite to their stated political aim of joining with Serbia and Montenegro as part of a Greater Serbia. […] In that sense, there was little need for the VJ and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to attempt to exercise any real degree of control over, as distinct from coordination with, the VRS. So long as the Republika Srpska and the VRS remained committed to the shared strategic objectives of the war, and the Main Staffs of the two armies could coordinate their activities at the highest levels, it was sufficient for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the VJ to provide the VRS with logistical supplies and, where necessary, to supplement the Bosnian elements of the VRS officer corps with non-Bosnian VJ or former JNA officers, to ensure that this process was continued” (ibid., paras. 603-604). 192 Ibid., para. 602. On this point, the Trial Chamber noted, further, that: “given that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had taken responsibility for the financing of the VRS, most of which consisted of former JNA soldiers and officers, it is a fact not to be wondered at that such financing would not only include payments to soldiers and officers but that Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999