124 48 of the Report of the Secretary-General337 and statements made in the Security Council by three of its fifteen Members to conclude that Article 5 of the Statute was to be interpreted as requiring that all crimes against humanity be committed with a discriminatory intent. In the Prosecution’s submission, these sources do not purport to reflect customary international law and thus should not be given undue, authoritative weight in interpreting Article 5. 338 It is the view of the Prosecution that Article 5 does not contain any ambiguity. Thus, to accord weight to these sources to resolve an ambiguity which, in the Prosecution’s submission, does not exist, would lead to considerable uncertainty with regard to the scope and content of Article 5 of the Statute. 339 276. The Prosecution submits that the rules of statutory interpretation also militate against requiring a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity. If discriminatory intent were required for all crimes against humanity, the Prosecution submits that this would relegate the crime of “persecutions” under Article 5(h) to a residual provision and make “other inhumane acts” in Article 5(i) redundant. The Prosecution submits that the Statute should be interpreted in order to give proper effect to all of its provisions. 340 277. Finally, the Prosecution submits that the requirement of discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity is inconsistent with the humanitarian object and purpose of the Statute and international humanitarian law. The Prosecution argues that requiring a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity would create a significant normative lacuna by failing to protect civilian populations not encompassed by the listed grounds of discrimination. 341 2. The Defence Case 278. The Defence submits that the Trial Chamber’s decision that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent should be upheld. 337 The statement reads as follows: “Crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature […] committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.” 338 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 5.7, 5.8; T. 162, 163 (20 April 1999). 339 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 5.20, 5.22. 340 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 5.24; T. 165 (20 April 1999). 341 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 5.26; T. 165 (20 April 1999). Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999