98 the intended offence, but a new fact, having its own causal autonomy, and linked to the conduct willed by the instigator (mandante) by a merely incidental relationship (emphasis 276 added). 219. The same notion was enunciated by the same Court of Cassation in many other cases. 277 That this was the basic notion upheld by the court seems to be borne out by the fact that the one instance where the same court adopted a different approach is somewhat conspicuous. 278 Accordingly, it would seem that, with regard to the mens rea element required for the criminal responsibility of a person for acts committed within a common purpose but not envisaged in the criminal design, that court either applied the notion of an attenuated form of intent (dolus eventualis) or required a high degree of carelessness (culpa). 220. In sum, the Appeals Chamber holds the view that the notion of common design as a form of accomplice liability is firmly established in customary international law and in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly, in the Statute of the International Tribunal. As for the objective and subjective elements of the crime, the case law shows that the notion has been applied to three distinct categories of cases. First, in cases of co-perpetration, where all participants in the common design possess the same criminal intent to commit a crime (and one or more of them actually perpetrate the crime, with intent). Secondly, in the so-called “concentration camp” cases, where the requisite mens rea comprises knowledge of the nature of the system of ill-treatment and intent to further the common design of illtreatment. Such intent may be proved either directly or as a matter of inference from the nature of the accused’s authority within the camp or organisational hierarchy. With regard to the third category of cases, it is appropriate to apply the notion of “common purpose” only where the following requirements concerning mens rea are fulfilled: (i) the intention to 276 See Giustizia penale, 1950, Part II, cols. 696-697 (emphasis added). See e.g. Court of Cassation, 15 March 1948, Peveri case, in Archivio penale, 1948, pp. 431-432; Court of Cassation, 20 July 1949, Mannelli case, in Giustizia penale, 1949, Part II, col. 906, no.599; Court of Cassation, 27 October 1949, P.M. v. Minafò, in Giustizia penale, 1950, Part II, col. 252, no. 202; 24 February 1950, Montagnino, ibid., col.821; 19 April 1950, Solesio et al., ibid., col. 822. By contrast, in a judgement of 23 October 1946 the same Court of Cassation, in Minapò et al., held that it was immaterial that the participant in a crime had or had not foreseen the criminal conduct carried out by another member of the criminal group (Giustizia penale, 1947, Part II, col. 483, no. 382). 278 In the Antonini case (judgement of the Court of Cassation of 29 March 1949), the trial court had found the accused guilty not only of illegally arresting some civilians but also of their subsequent shooting by the Germans, as a “reprisal” for an attack on German troops in Via Rasella, in Rome. According to the trial court the accused, in arresting the civilians, had not intended to bring about their killing, but knew that he thus brought into being a situation likely to lead to their killing. The Court of Cassation reversed this finding, 277 Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999