97 unforeseen (imprevisto) event”, for during a search a civilian had escaped to avoid being detained and had been shot at by the German soldier. 273 A similar position was taken by the same court in Ferrida. The appellant had participated, “only in his capacity as a nurse,” in a mopping-up operation in the course of which some partisans had been killed. The court found that he was not guilty of murder; the law on amnesty was therefore applicable to him. 274 In Bonati et al. the appellant argued that the crime of murder, not envisaged by the group of persons concerned, had been perpetrated by another member of that group. The Court of Cassation rejected the appeal, holding that the appellant was also guilty of murder. Although this crime was more grave than that intended by some of the participants (concorrenti), it “was in any case a consequence, albeit indirect, of his participation”. 275 218. In these cases courts indisputably applied the notion that a person may be held criminally responsible for a crime committed by another member of a group and not envisaged in the criminal plan. Admittedly, in some of the cases the mens rea required for a member of the group to be held responsible for such an action was not clearly spelled out. However, in light of other judgements handed down in the same period on the same matter, although not relating to war crimes, it may nevertheless be assumed that courts required that the event must have been predictable. In this connection it suffices to mention the judgement of the Court of Cassation of 20 July 1949 in Mannelli, where the court explained the required causal nexus as follows: The relationship of material causality by virtue of which the law makes some of the participants liable for the crime other than that envisaged, must be correctly understood from the viewpoint of logic and law and be strictly differentiated from an incidental relationship (rapporto di occasionalita’). Indeed, the cause, whether immediate or mediate, direct or indirect, simultaneous or successive, can never be confused with mere coincidence. For there to be a relationship of material causality between the crime willed by one of the participants and the different crime committed by another, it is necessary that the latter crime should constitute the logical and predictable development of the former (il logico e prevedibile sviluppo del primo). Instead, where there exists full independence between the two crimes, one may find, depending upon the specific circumstances, a merely incidental relationship (un rapporto di mera occasionalita’), but not a causal relationship. In the light of these criteria, he who requests somebody else to wound or kill cannot answer for a robbery perpetrated by the other person, for this crime does not constitute the logical development of 273 Judgement of 12 September 1946, in Archivio penale, 1947, Part II, pp. 88-89. Judgement of 25 July 1946, in Archivio penale, 1947, Part II, p. 88. 275 See handwritten text of the (unpublished) judgement of 5 July 1946, p. 19 (kindly provided by the Italian Public Record Office, Rome; on file with the International Tribunal’s Library). See also Giustizia penale, 1945-46, Part II, cols. 530-532. For cases where the Court of Cassation concluded that the participant was guilty of the more serious crime not envisaged in the common criminal design, see Torrazzini, judgement of 18 August 1946, in Archivio penale 1947, Part II, p. 89; Palmia, judgement of 20 September 1946, ibid. 274 Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999