SELMOUNI v. FRANCE JUDGMENT 30 Article 1 “1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. …” Article 16, paragraph 1 “1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in Article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in Articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 98. The Court finds that all the injuries recorded in the various medical certificates (see paragraphs 11-15 and 17-20 above) and the applicant’s statements regarding the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected while in police custody (see paragraphs 18 and 24 above) establish the existence of physical and – undoubtedly (notwithstanding the regrettable failure to order a psychological report on Mr Selmouni after the events complained of) – mental pain or suffering. The course of the events also shows that the pain or suffering was inflicted on the applicant intentionally for the purpose of, inter alia, making him confess to the offence which he was suspected of having committed. Lastly, the medical certificates annexed to the case file show clearly that the numerous acts of violence were directly inflicted by police officers in the performance of their duties. 99. The acts complained of were such as to arouse in the applicant feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical and moral resistance. The Court therefore finds elements which are sufficiently serious to render such treatment inhuman and degrading (see the Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment cited above, pp. 66-67, § 167, and the Tomasi judgment cited above, p. 42, § 115). In any event, the Court reiterates that, in respect of a person deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see the Ribitsch judgment cited above, p. 26, § 38, and the Tekin v. Turkey judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-IV, pp. 1517-18, § 53).