human beings and for mass communication and includes the right of each person to seek to communicate his own views to others, as well as the right to receive opinions and news from others. 56. The Complainants refer the African Commission to the Zambian case of Francis Kasoma v The 7 Attorney General , where compulsory registration of journalists ordered by the Zambian government was declared unconstitutional by the Zambian High Court in 1997. According to the Complainants, in that case, journalists were obliged to become members of a Media Association of Zambia and to register with a statutory Media Council. They submit that the High Court of Zambia quashed the decision and among the reasons given by the High Court Judge is that: “I do not in my view consider the decision to constitute the Media Council of Zambia to be in furtherance of the general objectives and purpose of the Constitutional powers, among them, to promote democracy and related democratic ideals such as freedom of expression, and press freedom in particular. … The decision to create the Media Council of Zambia is no doubt going to have an impact … on freedom of expression in that failure of one to affiliate himself to the Media Council of Zambia, or in the event of breach of any moral code determined by the council would entail losing his status as a journalist, and with the denial of the opportunity to express and communicate his ideas through the media”. 57. The High Court in Zambia went on to state that “in light of the above it cannot be seriously argued that the creation of the Media Association or any other regulatory body by the Government would be in furtherance of the ideal embodied in the Constitution, vis-à-vis freedom of expression and association. Consequently, I find that the decision to create the Media Association is not in furtherance of the objectives or purposes embodied in the Constitution in particular those protected in Articles 20 and 21 [which guarantee freedom of expression and association]”. 58. The Complainants further submitted that the provision under Section 84 of the AIPPA, which makes it compulsory to renew accreditation after a maximum period of twelve months, i.e. at the end of each calendar year, places journalists in a position of permanent insecurity. This, according to them, will have an extremely chilling effect on their ability to freely practice their trade and will inevitably lead to various degrees of self-censorship. 59. The Complainants argue that in those very rare instances where expression really does pose a risk to society, as in the example from Rwanda cited by the Respondent, this should be addressed through the criminal law, not by generalised restrictions on all journalists. 60. The Complainants submit that the real purpose of the licensing system established by AIPPA is to provide the Government with a measure of control over journalism and to prevent, or at least limit critical reporting. As a result, they claim, the licensing system for journalists imposed by the contested provisions of AIPPA does not serve a legitimate aim as required under international law. 61. In conclusion, the Complainants submit that modern jurisprudence accepts that it is contrary to freedom of expression to criminalise falsehoods, and to support this argument, they cite Chavunduka 8 and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another , where the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe observed that: “Plainly, embraced and underscoring the essential nature of freedom of expression, are statements, opinions and beliefs regarded by the majority as being wrong or false. As the revered HOLMES J so wisely observed inUnited States v Schwimmer 279 US 644 (1929) at 654, the fact that the particular content of a person’s speech might “excite popular prejudice” is no reason to deny it protection for “if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free thought -not free thought of that we hate.” Mere content, no matter how offensive, cannot be determinative of whether a statement qualifies for the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of expression.” Respondent State’s arguments on the merits 62. The Respondent State on its part submits that the Complainants have failed to establish a violation of Article 9 of the Charter, adding that it is misleading to suggest that the MIC is susceptible to political manipulation and control. According to the Respondent State, the operations of the MIC are