GIULIANI AND GAGGIO v. ITALY JUDGMENT 59 Zappia, the commanding officers had not been correctly informed of the decision to authorise the Tute Bianche march. Moreover, the law-enforcement personnel deployed in Genoa had not been familiar with the city and its streets. 222. The communications system chosen had merely allowed information to be exchanged between the police and carabinieri control centres but not direct radio contact between the police officers and carabinieri. In the applicants' view, these anomalies had led to the critical situation in which M.P. had found himself and which prompted him to resort to lethal force. There was a cause-and-effect relationship here which the Chamber had not identified. The applicants pointed out in that regard that policing operations had to be organised and planned in such a way as to avoid any arbitrariness, abuse of force or foreseeable incident. They referred to the Court's case-law (Makaratzis, cited above, § 68), to paragraph 24 of the UN Principles and to the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bratza, joined by Judge Šikuta, annexed to the Chamber judgment. 223. The lack of a clear chain of command had been the reason for the carabinieri attack on the Tute Bianche march and for the fact that a few hours later the jeeps had followed the carabinieri, having received no instructions to the contrary. M.P., who had been given permission to board one of the jeeps, had sustained burns, was reacting badly to his gas mask, was having trouble breathing and was injured and panic-stricken. Although the jeep's task had been to transport M.P. and D.R. to hospital, it had not left Piazza Alimonda before the carabinieri charge, and the two men, in distress and in a highly nervous state, had remained in the back of the vehicle. 224. The investigation had not provided any explanation as to why the jeeps had followed the detachment when the latter moved off to confront a group of demonstrators. Officers Lauro and Cappello, who had been in charge, stated at the “trial of the twenty-five” that they had not noticed the two jeeps following behind. Officer Cappello had also stated: “The jeep following behind has to be armoured, anything else is suicide”. Furthermore, the jeeps had been left without supervision, further evidence of the lack of organisation of the law-enforcement operation. (ii) M.P.'s physical and mental state and his lack of training 225. The applicants stressed that, owing to his physical and mental state, M.P. had been judged by his superior officers to be unfit to remain on duty. He had nevertheless been left in possession of a gun loaded with live ammunition and instead of being taken straight to hospital had been allowed to board a jeep which had no protection. M.P.'s situation had prevented him from making an accurate assessment of the danger he faced. If he had received the appropriate training he would not have panicked and would have had the necessary presence of mind to assess and deal with the situation correctly. The shots would have been avoided if the rear of the