GIULIANI AND GAGGIO v. ITALY JUDGMENT 57 (b) Application of these principles to the present case 211. The Court notes that the Genoa investigating judge took the view that the legitimacy of the use of force by M.P. should be assessed in the light of Articles 52 and 53 of the CC. It therefore considers that these provisions constituted, in the instant case, the legal framework defining the circumstances in which the use of firearms was authorised. 212. The first of these provisions concerns the ground of justification of self-defence, a common concept in the legal systems of the Contracting States. It refers to the “need” for defensive action and the “real” nature of the danger, and requires the defensive response to be proportionate to the attack (see paragraph 144 above). Even though the terms used are not identical, this provision echoes the wording of Article 2 of the Convention and contains the elements required by the Court's case-law. 213. Although Article 53 of the CC is couched in vaguer terms, it nevertheless refers to the person concerned being “obliged” to act in order to repel an act of violence (see paragraph 143 above). 214. It is true that from a purely semantic viewpoint the “need” mentioned in the Italian legislation appears to refer simply to the existence of a pressing need, whereas “absolute necessity” for the purposes of the Convention requires that, where different means are available to achieve the same aim, the means which entails the least danger to the lives of others must be chosen. However, this is a difference in the wording of the law which can be overcome by the interpretation of the domestic courts. As is clear from the decision to discontinue the case, the Italian courts have interpreted Article 52 of the CC as authorising the use of lethal force only as a last resort where other, less damaging, responses would not suffice to counter the danger (see paragraph 101 above, which mentions the references made by the Genoa investigating judge to the Court of Cassation's case-law in this sphere). 215. It follows that the differences between the standards laid down and the term “absolutely necessary” in Article 2 § 2 are not sufficient to conclude on this basis alone that no appropriate domestic legal framework existed (see Perk and Others v. Turkey, no. 50739/99, § 60, 28 March 2006, and Bakan, cited above, § 51; see also, conversely, Nachova and Others, cited above, §§ 96-102). 216. The applicants next complained of the fact that the law-enforcement agencies had not been equipped with non-lethal weapons, and in particular with guns firing rubber bullets. However, the Court notes that the officers on the ground had available to them means of dispersing and controlling the crowd which were not life-threatening, in the form of tear gas (see, conversely, Güleç, cited above, § 71, and Şimşek, cited above, §§ 108 and 111). In general terms, there is room for debate as to whether law-enforcement personnel should also be issued with other equipment of this type, such as water cannons and guns using non-lethal ammunition.