PANYIK v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 5 hand, point e) of the same section gives the courts a possibility to decide on a case-by-case basis in light of the circumstances of the particular case whether the judge is capable of administering the case objectively (“relative ground of exclusion”). 23. As regards the reasons for disqualification mentioned by the applicant, the Government emphasised that these cases had not been identical. On the first two occasions the judges themselves had declared that they were biased and consented to their exclusion; therefore, no deeper analysis or reasoning was required to ascertain the cause of bias. In the third occasion, however, the judge had not accepted that they had been biased and the applicant had not adduced any further concrete reasons which would clearly substantiate that the judge had nonetheless lacked objectivity. 24. The Government were therefore of the opinion that the proceedings in question and the decision concerning the bias had not been contrary to the requirements set forth under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 2. The Court’s assessment a. General principles 25. The Court reiterates at the outset that it is of fundamental importance in a democratic society that the courts inspire confidence in the public. To that end Article 6 requires a tribunal falling within its scope to be impartial. Impartiality normally denotes the absence of prejudice or bias and its existence or otherwise can be tested in various ways. The Court has thus distinguished between a subjective approach, that is endeavouring to ascertain the personal conviction or interest of a given judge in a particular case, and an objective approach, that is determining whether he or she offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (see Piersack v. Belgium, 1 October 1982, § 30, Series A no. 53; and Grieves v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 57067/00, § 69, ECHR 2003-XII (extracts)). 26. In applying the subjective test, the Court has consistently held that the personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (see Hauschildt v. Denmark, 24 May 1989, § 47, Series A no. 154). As regards the type of proof required, the Court has, for example, sought to ascertain whether a judge has displayed hostility or ill will or has arranged to have a case assigned to himself for personal reasons (see De Cubber v. Belgium, 26 October 1984, § 25, Series A no. 86). The principle that a tribunal shall be presumed to be free of personal prejudice or partiality is long-established in the case-law of the Court (see, for example, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23 June 1981, § 58, Series A no. 43). 27. Although in some cases it may be difficult to procure evidence with which to rebut the presumption, it must be remembered that the requirement