that need to be struck between the competing and sometimes conflicting forces that shape its society.2° 81. However, the Court emphasises that while it is for a particular State to determine the mechanisms or steps to be taken for purposes of implementing the Charter, it retains the jurisdiction to assess and review the steps taken for compliance with the Charter and other applicable human rights standards. In particular, the Court's duty is to assess if a fair balance has been struck between societal interests and the interests of the individual as protected under the Charter. The doctrine of margin of appreciation, therefore, while recognising legitimate leverage by States in the implementation of the Charter, cannot be used by States to oust the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. 82.In the absence of clear justification as to how the differentiation and distinction in article 41(7) is necessary and reasonable in a democratic society, the Court finds that article between 41(7) of the Respondent State’s Constitution effects a distinction litigants and that this distinction has no justification under the Charter. This distinction is such that individuals within the Respondent State are excluded from pursuing a remedy before the court simply because of the subject matter of their grievances while other individuals with grievances not related to the election of a president are not equally barred. 83.In the circumstances, the Court holds that article 41(7) of the Respondent State’s Constitution violates the Applicant's right to be free from discrimination as guaranteed under Article 2 of the Charter. B. Alleged violation of the right to equal protection of the law 84.The Applicant argues that notwithstanding article 13(6)(a) of the Respondent State’s Constitution, article 41(7) of the same prohibits any person aggrieved by 25 Prince v. South Africa (2004) AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004) § 51. 26 Cf. Tanganyika Law Society and others v. Tanzania (merits) § 106. 23