DRC to address the situation of the Batwas by way of reparation of the
violations and specific harms alleged in the Communication.
31. They further allege that the national procedures initiated by the Batwas with
tribunals and Courts in the DRC, including seizure of the Supreme Court, have
been unduly prolonged for more than eight years, which represents undue
delay in the light of the Commission's jurisprudential practice, including those
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (CIDH) and the European
Commission on Human Rights (CEDH). They allege that upon seizure of the
Commission in November 2015, no date had been set for the hearing whereas
the Supreme Court had been seized on 20 December, 2013.
32. The Complainants also allege that there is nu law protecting group and
individual rights of Batwas regarding their ancestral lands and their resources.
They further maintain that there is no procedure for demarcation of lands nor
for granting titles to indigenous communities on lands they occupy and
depend on for their livelihood and survival. Furthermore, in the event of
expropriation, there does not exist any effective legal mechanism for the
restitution of traditional lands of indigenous communities. As a result, the only
potential means of redress open to the Bamas are civil remedies generally
available
to
persons
who oppose
unjustified
eviction
pursuant
to
the
Ordinance-Law governing expropriation of lands for a public purpose. These
civil redress mechanisms are not adequate nor sufficient to deal specific
violations contained in the Complaint since they do not provide the possibility
for Batwas to ascertain their rights to their ancestral lands.
33. The Complainants argue that Article 56(5) does not require them to exhaust all
discretionary and/or non-judicial remedies? In support of their argument,
they point out that the Commission clearly established in its Communication
375/09-Priscilla Njeri Eclmria (represented by the Federation of Women
Law:/ers of Kem/a and the International Centre for the Protection of Human
Rights) v. Kenya that << the domestic remed/ referenced in Article 56(5) inziolves II
reniedi/ of the .judicial lll('llSlllU sought hum the courts "¥l'lll(ll slznll llol be subject to
the discretionary power ofa public nutlzorih/" [....] Only mrlndnton/ domestic remedies
must be exlmusterl >>~* Consequently, the Batwa are not required to exhaust all
2 Communication 231/99 Arvornls Sans Fronfirirrs (pour lt vorujih :Irs Hzzvlurlpuirryv) .y Rummli (2(X)0) CAD! IF paras
2223 ; Communication 268/03 Hfesanmi t/ Niguriu (2005) CADI IP para 42, See also Communication 211/98 Au'tcd
B. Cudjoc :J Ghana (1999) CAD! IP Para. 14 & Communication 313/05 Kvnnelh Good (y Republic o./Botswana (2010)
CADI IP Para 88
:I Communication 375/09 Priscilla Njnri Eclmria (represented by the Federation of WomenLawyers of Kenya and ill'
International Cenfrcfor the Protection of Human Rights) v/ Kenya (201 I) para, 53
6