ii. Objection to admissibility of the Application for failure to file the Application within a reasonable time 46. The Respondent State, in its Response, affirms that the impugned law was enacted on 30 December 2011 and that it is only on 26 July 2016 that the Applicants brought the matter before this Court, that is, about five (5) years after the promulgation of the impugned law; that the Applicants in their Reply did not adduce any argument to justify this particularly long timeframe in filing the case before the Court. 47 ' The Applicants, in their Reply, submit that the alleged viotations are "continuing" and that, in the circumstances, the period can start to count only after the cessation of the said violations. *** 48. The Court notes that Article 56 (6) of the Charter and Rule 40 (6) of the Rules specify that Applications shall be filed within a reasonable time counting from the date local remedies were exhausted or from the date set by the Court as being the commencement of the time within which it shall be seized with the matter. 49. As has been indicated (paragraphs 46 and 47\, whereas for the Respondent State the period for seizure of the Court must be reckoned from the date of promulgation of the impugned law; for the Applicants, this period will start to count only after the cessation of the alleged violations, that is, after the abrogation or review of the impugned law. 50. The Court is however of the opinion that, in the instant case, in which no remedy was available to the Applicants at domestic level, the date from which the reasonableness of filing the Application before this Court should be assessed is that on which the Applicants acquired knowledge of the impugned law. 1 uropean Court of Human Rights adopted this same position in Dennis and Others v. Kingdom. lt held that, where it is clear from the outset that q L2 P I ry @" O"