24 noted, the State acquiesced to the allegation that it had violated Article 8(1) of the Convention. 97. Considering the proven facts, the State’s acquiescence, and the criteria defined by this Court in connection with the reasonable time principle,73 it is the Court’s opinion that the duration of the criminal proceedings instituted against Mr. Kimel extended beyond what is reasonable. Likewise, and according to the Court’s prior cases,74 it considers that the State has failed to provide justification for such protracted duration. Therefore, it declares that the State has violated Article 8(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Kimel. VIII REPARATIONS (APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 63(1) OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION) 98. It is an International Law rule that any violation of an international obligation that has caused damage entails the duty to provide adequate reparation.75 The Court has based its decisions on this particular matter on Article 63(1) of the American Convention.76 99. In the context of the acknowledgment made by the State (supra paras. 18 and 22), in accordance with the considerations on the merits and the violations of the Convention declared in the above chapters, as well as in the light of the criteria laid down in the Court’s case law in relation to the nature and scope of the obligation to repair,77 the Court will now rule on the claims made by the representatives and the Commission and on the position of the State regarding reparations, for the purpose of ordering adequate measures intended to repair the damage. A) INJURED PARTY 100. Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Convention, the Court considers Mr. Eduardo Kimel as the “injured party,” given his status as the victim of the declared violations, as a result of which he will be entitled to such reparations as may be set by the Court for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 73 Said principles are: i) the complexity of the matter, ii) the procedural activity of the involved party, and iii) the actions of judicial authorities. Cf. Case of Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 30, para. 77; Case of Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 155, para. 102, and Case of Escué-Zapata v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 165, para. 102. 74 Cf. Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 145; Case of Gómez-Palomino v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 136, para. 85, and Case of ChaparroAlvarez y Lapo Iñíguez, supra note 17, para. 161. 75 Cf. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, para 25; Case of Albán-Cornejo et al v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2007. Series C No. 171, para. 138, and Case of the Saramaka People, supra note 14, para. 131. 76 Article 63(1) of the American Convention provides that: If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by [the] Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 77 Cf. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez, supra note 75, paras. 25 to 27; Case of the “White Van” (PaniaguaMorales et al.), supra note 14, paras. 76 to 79; Case of Albán-Cornejo, supra note 75, para. 139, and Case of the Saramaka People, supra note 14, para. 187.