22 activities go beyond the private sphere to enter the realm of public debate.63 This threshold is not based on the nature of the individual, but on the public interest inherent in the actions he performs,64 as when a judge conducts an investigation into a massacre committed in the context of a military dictatorship, as in the instant case. 87. The democratic control exercised through public opinion encourages the transparency of State actions and promotes the responsibility of public officials in the performance of their duties. Hence, the greater tolerance to the statements and opinions expressed by individuals in the exercise of such democratic power.65 These are the requirements of the pluralism inherent in a democratic society,66 which requires the greatest possible flow of information and opinions on issues of public interest.67 88. In the domain of political debate on issues of great public interest, not only is the expression of statements which are well seen by the public opinion and those which are deemed to be harmless protected, but also the expression of statements which shock, irritate or disturb public officials or any sector of society.68 In a democratic society, the press must inform extensively on issues of public interest which affect social rights, and public officials must account for the performance of their duties. 89. The critical statements made by Mr. Kimel were related to issues of public concern, regarding a judge in his capacity as public official and amounted to opinions which did not entail the imputation of facts. As stated in the judgment rendered in the first instance (supra para. 43), the paragraph which was the grounds for prosecuting Mr. Kimel contained an opinion rather than the imputation of a fact: Mr. Kimel […] merely poses a question […]. In no way, in accordance with the existing case law on this matter, may it be validly held that such epithets may be tantamount to the imputation of a criminal conduct, under the terms required by the criminal definition of [defamation]. A question as such may not involve a specific imputation, but a mere judgment which is absolutely subjective –and also exposed to the readers’ subjectivity- by the author of a no less subjective appreciation of the value of the evidentiary elements filed in the case by the [complainant]. It is, therefore, criticism containing an opinion on the performance of the public duties of a judge in a given case. But a different assessment of the facts and circumstances may in no way imply the categorical false imputation of a publicly actionable crime.69 90. As to the evident public interest of the issues on which Mr. Kimel gave his opinion, the testimony rendered thereby at the public hearing (supra para. 9), which was not challenged by the State, is to be noted: The San Patricio Massacre ha[d] been considered the most serious murder suffered by the Catholic Church over its centuries in Argentina [.] The main and only purpose of the book ha[d] evidently been retelling the murder of the Palotine clergymen, bring to light what had been unknown and invisible for society, the tragic history of the killing of five clergymen massacred in their house under the most horrible circumstances.70 63 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 12, para. 129, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 44, para 103. 64 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 12, para. 129, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 44, para. 103. 65 Cf. Case of Ivcher-Bronstein, supra note 12, para. 155; Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 12, para. 127; Case of Palamara-Iribarne, supra note 12, para. 83, and Case of Claude-Reyes et al., supra note 44, para. 87. 66 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 12, para. 113, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 44, para. 83. 67 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 12, para. 127. 68 Cf. Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.), supra note 48, para. 69; Case of Ivcher-Bronstein, supra note 12, para. 152, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 44, para. 83. 69 Cf. Judgment of September 25, 1995, supra note 28, folio 59. 70 Cf. Testimony rendered by Eduardo Kimel at the public hearing (supra para. 9).