17 briefs submitted thereto, in the understanding that the parties have had the opportunity to express their respective positions with regard to the relevant facts.”52 62. In the instant case, neither the Commission nor the representatives have alleged the violation of Article 9 of the American Convention which enshrines freedom from ex post facto laws. Notwithstanding, the Court considers that the facts described in the instant case, which have been accepted by the State and on which the parties have had plenty of opportunity to raise their arguments show that such principle has been violated under the following terms. 63. The Court has pointed out that “restrictions on freedom of information must be established by law.”53 In this regard, any limitation or restriction must be both formally and materially provided for by law. Now, should the restrictions or limitations be of a criminal nature, it is also necessary to strictly meet the requirements of the criminal definition in order to adhere to the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia principle. Thus, they must be formulated previously, in an express, accurate, and restrictive manner. The legal system must affor legal certainty to the individuals. In this regard, the Court has pointed out that: The court understands that in the formulation of criminal definitions it is necessary to use restrictive and univocal terms, which clearly limit the punishable conducts, thus making the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia criminal principle effective. This implies an accurate definition of the criminalized conduct, which sets its elements and allows it to be delimited and distinguishable from non-punishable acts or illegal acts punishable with sanctions other than criminal. Ambiguity in the formulation of criminal definitions generates doubts and opens the door to the discretion of the authorities, particularly undesirable where the criminal liability of a person is to be determined and punished with sanctions which severely affect fundamental rights, such as life or freedom. Rules such as the ones applied in the instant case, which do not strictly delimit the criminal conducts, are in violation of the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia principle.54 64. As established above, in the first instance Mr. Kimel was found guilty for false imputation of a publicly actionable crime. The criminal definition applied was Article 110 of the Criminal Code which provides as follows: Anyone who damages another person’s honor or reputation shall be punished with a fine from 1,500.00 to 90,000.00 pesos or imprisonment from one month to one year. 65. He was later acquitted by the Sixth Court of the National Appeals Chamber for Criminal and Correctional Matters. Lastly, the Supreme Court of Justice did not adhere to the original criminal definition applied and decided that the facts charged to Mr. Kimel constituted the crime described in Article 109 of the Criminal Code, which provides as follows: The false imputation of a publicly actionable crime resulting in a criminal proceeding shall be punished with imprisonment from one to three years. 66. The Court emphasizes that in the instant case the State alleged that “the lack of sufficient accuracy in the criminal legislation punishing defamation and preventing the infringement of the right to freedom of thought and expression entails the State’s failure to 52 Cf. Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C No. 5, para 172; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 54, and Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 186. 53 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, supra note 44, para. 89. 54 Cf. Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al., supra note 12, para. 121, and Case of Lori Berenson, supra note 12, para. 125. Furthermore, the Court has emphasized that laws providing for restrictions “must use accurate criteria rather than grant unfettered discretion to the authorities who are to impose them.” Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 44, para. 124.