13 45. The judgment referred to above sentenced Mr. Kimel to one-year suspended imprisonment, as well as to the payment of $ 20,000.00 (twenty thousand Argentine pesos) as compensation for the damage caused, plus legal costs and expenses.31 46. Said judgment was appealed before the Sixth Court of the National Appeals Chamber for Criminal and Correctional Matters, which on November 19, 1996, rendered judgment overturning the sentence imposed under the following terms: when referring to the judicial investigation, Mr. [Kimel] gives his own opinion about it, which was attacked by the court a quo, as it interpreted that he should not do so but only inform. I do not share this view [, …] what is relevant is determining whether his opinion has harmful effects for third parties or is encouraged by hidden biased or particular purposes, as otherwise it would only serve the purpose of informing and orienting readers on an issue of public interest, as long as he has based his opinion on professional responsibility and the truthfulness of his statements. At present, journalism cannot be conceived as an automatic activity aimed at informing which may not include an opinion […], this does not mean that any ideas can be expressed without taking into account the limitations imposed by ethics and the criminal laws that repress and punish them, respectively, where they injure honor, trespass on privacy, or damage the dignity of other persons, among other values.32 […] This isolated value judgment [,] specifically, the expression “the actions of judges during the military dictatorship made them, in general, acquiescent, if not accomplices to the dictatorial regime”] does not amount to defamation, as the latter requires the false imputation of a specific publicly actionable crime to a specific individual33 […]. [T]he criticism made of the Judge […] is only the opinion of a layman on the progress of a judicial investigation which he would have handled in a different manner, had he been in the place of the complainant [. T]herefore, it cannot affect his honor in his capacity as a public official […] and though Mr. Kimel may not share the manner in which he handled the case, there is nothing in this paragraph to show that his opinion was given with the malice required to constitute the legal definition [of defamation].34 47. In referring to the false imputation of a publicly actionable crime, the Appeals Court referred to the work of Mr. Kimel as a “brief historical review” and added that “in sai[d] work, he has not gone beyond the ethical limits of his profession.”35 Furthermore, it established that “the defendant exercised his legitimate right to inform in a non-abusive manner, and without the intent to injure the [complainant’s] honor, as no malice, an element which is sufficient to constitute the illegal act under examination, was proven.”36 48. This decision was appealed by the complainant by means of a motion for special review filed with the Supreme Court of Justice. On December 22, 1998, the Supreme Court reversed the acquittal judgment on appeal and forwarded the case to the Appeals Chamber for Criminal and Correctional Matters so that a new decision be delivered. The Supreme Court considered that the appealed judgment had been arbitrary on the grounds that: in the instant case, the arguments put forward by the judges who signed the acquittal judgment determining that the statements made by Mr. Kimel did not fit into the definition of defamation are groundless. This is particularly so as only from an incomplete and disjointed reading of the incriminating text could it be said –as does the court a quo- that the criminal imputation is not addressed to the complainant. In his book, the defendant, after mentioning the [complainant] and stating that the performance of the judges during the military dictatorship in general made them accomplices to the dictatorial regime, expressed that in the case of the Palotine clergymen the [complaining judge] complied with most of the formal requirements regarding the investigation, though it is evident that a number of decisive elements that could have shed light on the murder were not taken into consideration. The evidence [that] the order to carry out the murder had come 31 Cf. Judgment of September 25, 1995, supra note 30. 32 Cf. Judgment of November 19, 1996, rendered by the National Appeals Chamber for Criminal and Correctional Matters (record of appendixes to the application, Volume I, Appendix 2, folios 85 and 86). 33 Cf. Judgment of November 19, 1996, supra note 32, folio 87. 34 Cf. Judgment of November 19, 1996, supra note 32, folios 88 and 89. 35 Cf. Judgment of November 19, 1996, supra note 32, folio 92. 36 Cf. Judgment of November 19, 1996, supra note 32, folio 95.