117. The Applicant asserts that the domestic authorities were responsible for the delay. He submits that the exorbitant delay was not justified by any explanation and it can only be attributed to the inertia, inefficiency or negligence of the judicial authorities. * 118. The Respondent State did not make any submissions with respect to the Applicant’s allegation of undue delay in conducting his trial. *** 119. The Court notes that Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter guarantees “the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.” This provision embodies one of the fundamental tenets of a fair trial the essence of which is perfectly encapsulated in the old legal adage “justice delayed is justice denied”. 120. The Court observes that a timely trial is crucial for a variety of reasons, including protecting the accused from enduring protracted periods of uncertainty and pretrial detention, which can inflict physical, emotional, and psychological distress. Additionally, expeditious proceedings play a pivotal role in maintaining the integrity of evidence and the recollection of witnesses, thereby facilitating a more precise depiction of events and augmenting the overall credibility of the judicial proceedings. 121. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges that the determination of a reasonable timeframe for conducting a trial does not have a specific template, as it hinges on the unique characteristics of each individual case. In accordance with its jurisprudence, the Court reiterates that the evaluation of whether justice has been administered within a reasonable time under the purview of Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter takes into account a range of factors. Among these considerations are the complexity of the case, the conduct exhibited by the involved parties, and the actions of the judicial 30