-34national laws on freedom of expression are clear and precise enough". This position was reaffirmed and defended at the Public Hearing of 20 and 21 March 2014. 128. The Court recalls that the UN Human Rights Committee defined in a relatively precise manner the concept of "law" as set out in Article 19 (2) of the Covenant. In the Committee's view: "[ ... ]to be considered as "law'', norms have to be drafted with sufficient darity to enable an individual to adapt his behaviour to the rules and made accessible to the public. The law cannot give persons who are in charge of its application unlimited powers of decision on the restriction of freedom of expression. Laws must contain rules which are sufficiently precise to allow persons in charge of their application to know what forms of expression are legitimately restricted and what forms of expression are unduly restricted" 10 . 129. In its consideration of communications regarding Article 9 of the Charter, the Commission has held that "Though in the African Charter, the grounds of limitation to freedom of expression are not expressly provided as in other international and regional human rights treaties, the phrase "within the law", under Article 9 (2) provides a leeway to cautiously fit in legitimate and justifiable individual, limitation 11 . collective and national interests as grounds of Here the phrase "within the law" must be interpreted in reference to international norms which can provide grounds of limitation on freedom of expression" 12 . 10 Human Rights Committee, Keun-Tae Kim v. The Republic of Korea, Communication No. 574/1994, CCPR/C/64/D/57411994, 4 January 1999, para 25 11 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Kenneth Good v. The Republic of Botswana, Communication No. 313105, para 188 12 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, Communication No. 54/91-61/91-98/93-164/97-196/97-210198, para 102