exhaust local remedies in respect of this allegation. It thus finds this allegation inadmissible. 52. Regarding the third allegation, of torture by police, the Court notes that the Applicant did raise this issue before the national courts, particularly at the High Court. The High Court’s conclusion was that the Applicant had failed to prove that he had been tortured before the confession statement was obtained. The Court of Appeal also took the view that the Applicant had failed to repudiate the prosecution’s assertions that he had not been tortured. Given that domestic courts had occasion to evaluate the Applicant’s allegations of torture, the Court finds that the Applicant exhausted local remedies in relation to this claim as well. 53. Consequently, while dismissing the Respondent State’s objection, the Court holds that the Applicant exhausted local remedies as envisaged under Rule 50(2)(e) of the Rules only with regard to the allegation of violation of the right to fair trial, by reason of the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence, and the right to dignity due to his alleged torture. B. Objection based on failure to file the Application within a reasonable time 54. The Respondent State contends that the Applicant has not fulfilled the admissibility requirements as provided under Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules, as he did not file the Application within a reasonable timeframe. 55. In support of its position, the Respondent State contends that the Court of Appeal’s decision was handed down on 3 September 2015 but the Applicant lodged this Application on the 5 December 2018 after three (3) years and three (3) months had elapsed. The Respondent State contends that a time lapse of such a duration cannot be considered as reasonable. 56. In buttressing its position, the Respondent States cites the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Majuru v. Zimbabwe and contends that a reasonable timeframe should concur with the other 13