Page 18 of 30 nearly all the statutory powers is either entrusted to or is subject to review by the administrative courts at several levels; this is true of the taking of a child into care, a refusal to terminate care and most steps taken in the implementation of care decisions (see paragraphs 44, 45 and 50 above). Taking these safeguards into consideration, the scope of the discretion conferred on the authorities by the laws in question appears to the Court to be reasonable and acceptable for the purposes of Article 8 (art. 8). 63. The Court thus concludes that the interferences in question were "in accordance with the law". C. Legitimate aim 64. The applicants submitted that, of the aims listed in paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2), only the "protection of health or morals" could have justified the decision to take the children into care, but that their health or morals were not in fact endangered when it was adopted. The Commission, on the other hand, considered that the decisions concerning the care and the placement of the children were taken in their interests and had the legitimate aims of protecting health or morals and protecting the "rights and freedoms of others". 65. In the Court’s view, the relevant Swedish legislation is clearly designed to protect children and there is nothing to suggest that it was applied in the present case for any other purpose. The interferences in question - intended as they were to safeguard the development of Stefan, Helena and Thomas therefore had, for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2), the legitimate aims attributed to them by the Commission. D. "Necessary in a democratic society" 66. The applicants maintained that the measures at issue could not be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society". This submission was contested by the Government, but accepted by a majority of the Commission. 1. Introduction 67. According to the Court’s established case-law, the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; in determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (see, amongst many authorities, the above-mentioned W v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A no. 121, p. 27, § 60 (b) and (d)). 68. There was considerable discussion during the hearing before the Court as to the approach to be adopted by the Convention institutions in resolving the necessity issue. The Commission’s Delegate summarised the approach taken by the majority of the Commission as being: "to stay ... within the judgments of the domestic courts and, after making a detailed study of the relevant judgments, conclude whether or not [their] contents ... reveal sufficient reasons for taking a child into public care." She summarised the minority’s approach as being: "to stay within the judgments of the domestic courts and to examine whether the reasons [therein] seem to indicate that [they] have based themselves on irrelevant circumstances or that they have applied unacceptable criteria or standards for the justification of a public-care order. In essence the question is whether the national court has misjudged the necessity." The Government favoured the minority’s approach, adding that a wide margin of appreciation should be afforded to the national authorities so long as there was no reason to believe that the decisions were not taken in good faith, with due care and in a reasonable manner. The approach which the Court has consistently adopted - and from which it sees no reason to depart on the present occasion - differs somewhat from those described above. In the first place, its review is not limited to ascertaining whether a respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith (see, inter alia, the above-mentioned Sunday Times judgment, Series A no. 30, p. 36, § 59). In the second place, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court cannot confine itself to considering the impugned decisions in isolation, but must look at them in the light of the case as a http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?sessionId=60525252&skin=hudoc-en&a... 10/13/2010