distinction between the right to equality before the law, guaranteed by Article 3, and the right to a fair trial, including the right to defence, protected by Article 7 (1) (d) of the African Charter. Indeed, the trial would lose all its fairness if the parties were placed in a position of legal or procedural inequality. This means that that no one could claim to have enjoyed the right to defend himself if he or she were not afforded the same opportunity as his opponent, under the same conditions, to present his or her case and produce evidence. 118. As one of the rights of a fair trial, the right to defence guaranteed by Article 7 (1) (d) of the African Charter is the base for the principle of equality of arms. Guidelines A (2) (a) and (e) confirm that a fair trial includes, among others, “equality of arms between the parties to a proceedings, whether they be administrative, civil, criminal, or military” and “adequate opportunity to prepare a case, present arguments and evidence and to challenge or respond to opposing arguments or evidence”. 27 119. As a corollary of a fair trial, the principle of equality of arms is rooted in a number of international instruments and extensively developed in jurisprudence, be it national or international. Even if it is not explicitly, normative guarantees of the right to equality of arms clearly emanate from the provisions of Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which state that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair hearing by a tribunal”. Equality between the parties consequently entails equality before the law and respect for the rights of defence. In this sense, it is a delicate and subtle task to separate equality before the law, and by extension equality of arms, from the right to a fair trial. Article 14 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has this to say about the need for equality: “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. All persons are equal before the law…” 120. Jurisprudence embraces the connection in various ways, but following a constantly convergent approach. In the case of Szwabowicz v. Sweden, one notices, for instance, that the European Commission of Human Rights enshrines the principle when it states that the right to a fair trial requires that a party to a civil action, and a fortiori to criminal proceedings, must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case in court under conditions which do not place him at a significantly disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent. 28 Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2001), Principles A (2) (a) and (e) 28 Szwabowicz v. Sweden (30 June 1959) Application No. 434/58 27 23