set out in international human rights instruments ratified by the State concerned, which does not make it an appellate court.7 The Court thus dismisses the Respondent State’s submissions on this point. 32. In relation to the contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction to quash convictions, set aside the sentence or order release from prison, the Court recalls that Article 27(1) of the Protocol provides that “[i]f the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples' right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.” Clearly, therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to grant various types of reparation, including release from prison, should the facts of a case so dictate. The Respondent State’s submissions are thus dismissed. 33. In view of the above, the Court dismisses the Respondent State’s objections to its material jurisdiction and holds that it has material jurisdiction to hear these consolidated Applications. B. Other aspects of jurisdiction 34. The Court notes that the Respondent State does not dispute its personal, temporal and territorial jurisdiction. 35. Having noted that nothing on record indicates that it lacks jurisdiction, the Court holds that it has: i. Personal jurisdiction insofar as the Respondent State is a party to the Protocol and has deposited the Declaration. The Court recalls, as it did in paragraph 2 of this judgment, that on 21 November 2019, the Respondent State deposited an instrument withdrawing 7 Armand Guehi v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 477, § 33; Werema Wangoko Werema and Another v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 520, § 29 and Alex Thomas v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (20 November 2015) 1 AfCLR 465, § 130. 10